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INTRODUCTION
Both the right to proceed pro se and liberal pleading standards
reflect the modern civil legal system’s emphasis on protecting access
1
to courts. Self-representation has firm roots in the notion that all individuals, no matter their status or wealth, are entitled to air griev2
ances for which they may be entitled to relief. Access, then, must not
be contingent upon retaining counsel, lest the entitlement become a
mere privilege denied to certain segments of society. Similarly, because pleading is the gateway by which litigants access federal courts,
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure purposefully
3
eschewed strict sufficiency standards. In their place, the drafters instituted a regime in which a complaint quite easily entitled its author
to discovery in order to prevent dismissal of cases before litigants have
4
had an adequate opportunity to demonstrate their merit.
Far from just articulating a common systemic value, though, the
right to prosecute one’s own case without assistance of counsel in fact

1

See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Few
issues . . . are more significant than pleading standards, which are the key that opens
access to courts.”); Drew A. Swank, In Defense of Rules and Roles: The Need to Curb Extreme
Forms of Pro Se Assistance and Accommodation in Litigation, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1537, 1546
(2005) (noting that “[o]pen access to the courts for all citizens” is one of the principles
upon which the right to prosecute one’s own case is founded).
2
See Swank, supra note 1, at 1546 (discussing the importance of self-representation
to the fundamental precept of equality before the law).
3
See Proceedings of the Institute on Federal Rules (1938) (statement of Edgar Tolman),
reprinted in RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 301-13 (William W. Dawson ed., 1938).
4
See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck & Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible
Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal? 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA
141, 148 (2009), http://pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf (Burbank, Rebuttal) (asserting that the drafters of the Federal Rules objected to a technical
pleading regime because it would “too often cut[] off adjudication on the merits”).
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depends significantly upon liberal pleading standards. The ability to
6
file a “short and plain statement of the claim” mitigates the impact
that the choice to proceed pro se has on litigants’ access to discovery
by reducing the number of technicalities and requirements the satisfaction of which demands legal expertise. However, recognizing that
transsubstantive pleading standards do not sufficiently account for the
capability differential between represented and unrepresented litigants, the Supreme Court fashioned a rule of special solicitude for pro
7
se pleadings. Accordingly, “pro se complaint[s], ‘however inartfully
pleaded,’ [are] held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings
8
drafted by lawyers.’”
Notably, however, the Court granted such leniency, or “liberal construction,” to pro se pleadings against the backdrop of Conley v. Gib9
son’s undemanding “no set of facts” standard. The Court’s failure to
10
explain how pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed indicates its
belief that the standard was already lenient enough to render a detailed
5

Cf. Charles E. Clark, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Last Phase—
Underlying Philosophy Embodied in Some of the Basic Provisions of the New Procedure, 23 A.B.A.
J. 976, 976-77 (1937) (commenting that liberal pleading rules were necessary to mitigate information asymmetries between plaintiffs and defendants that often led to premature dismissal of suits). Notably, in no suits are such information asymmetries more
apparent than those in which pro se litigants sue represented adversaries. These types
of suits comprise the vast majority in which pro se litigants appear. Cf. Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study
of the Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 305, 323
(showing that the majority of pro se cases involve unrepresented plaintiffs who sue governmental defendants).
6
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
7
See Robert Bacharach & Lyn Entzeroth, Judicial Advocacy in Pro Se Litigation: A
Return to Neutrality, 42 IND. L. REV. 19, 22-26 (2009) (noting that courts created ways to
ensure that meritorious pro se suits would not be dismissed simply because the litigants
lacked legal knowledge and experience, one of which was liberal construction).
8
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam)).
9
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (“[A] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”),
abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561-63 (2007). This standard epitomized the notice-pleading regime envisioned by the drafters of the Federal Rules, who
emphasized discovery as the stage at which a claim’s true merit would come to light, rather than pleading. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987, 990 (2003) (“With merits determination as the goal, the Federal Rules create
a new procedural system that massively deemphasizes the role of pleadings.”).
10
See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 29-30 (asserting that because the
Supreme Court never defined the “degree of relaxation” afforded pro se pleadings in
comparison to the liberal notice pleading standard applicable to all litigants, lower
courts adopted different iterations of the rule).
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articulation of the practice unnecessary to prevent premature dismissal
11
of meritorious cases. However, with Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
12
Ashcroft v. Iqbal retiring the “no set of facts” standard and ratifying
the means by which lower courts dismissed more disfavored cases un13
der Conley, liberal construction as presently practiced is not—if it ever
was—sufficient to protect pro se litigants’ access to courts.
14
The new plausibility standard with which courts now determine
15
the adequacy of complaints disproportionately harms pro se litigants.
First, the Supreme Court’s instruction that “conclusory” facts not be
16
presumed true when determining a claim’s plausibility will affect
those who (1) lack the resources to develop facts before discovery,
(2) bring claims requiring them to plead information exclusively within
the opposition’s possession, or (3) rely on forms in drafting complaints.
Pro se litigants typify the parties who demonstrate all three behaviors.
Second, determining whether the remaining allegations permit a plaus17
ible inference of wrongdoing, as per the Supreme Court’s instruction,
is a wildly subjective endeavor. Courts are likely—no doubt unintentionally—to draw inferences that disfavor pro se litigants because their
“judicial common sense” judgments of what is plausible result from a

11

550 U.S. 544 (2007).
129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
13
See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 435-37 (1986) (explaining how the reemergence of fact pleading resulted from lower courts’ refusals to accept conclusory allegations as sufficient under the Federal Rules in particular categories of suits).
14
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (requiring a complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”).
15
See Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 615 (2010) (observing a substantially greater increase
in the rate of dismissal of pro se suits than represented suits post-Iqbal).
16
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (“[T]he allegations are conclusory and not entitled
to be assumed true.”); Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 579 (“Iqbal invites judges
to . . . eliminate from consideration all the complaint’s conclusory allegations . . . .”).
The parsing of a complaint into conclusory and nonconclusory factual allegations disregards the Federal Rules’ express disavowal of fact pleading, along with their requirement that all facts be presumed true when determining the adequacy of a complaint. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 115 (2009) (noting that the drafters of the Federal Rules
rejected fact pleading because of the impossibility of distinguishing between conclusions and facts); Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 563 (discussing courts’ obligations to credit as true all factual allegations in a complaint).
17
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a
court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.”).
12
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drastically different set of background experiences and values. The
admixture of these two steps portends serious trouble for pro se litigants, who, even before the plausibility standard, did not fare well de19
spite the leeway afforded their complaints.
Accordingly, this Comment reevaluates the effectiveness of liberal
construction as a bulwark against premature dismissal of pro se complaints. Part I discusses pro se litigation generally. It documents the
rise of the federal pro se docket, the reasons individuals choose to
proceed pro se, and the unique challenges they face as a result of that
choice. Because courts established liberal construction in response to
those challenges, Part I ends by considering how this leniency operates in practice. Part II examines in detail the new plausibility standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. Particularly, it dissects
the Court’s two-pronged approach to demonstrate how each step is
uniquely hostile to pro se litigants. This hostility explains the disproportionate impact that the decision has had and will continue to have
on their complaints. Part III suggests a way to reinvigorate the leeway
afforded pro se litigants and bring self-representation closer to epitomizing our system’s goal of providing equal court access. Specifically,
Part III advocates for (1) limiting disregard of “conclusory” factual allegations in pro se pleadings and (2) increasing transparency with respect to the inferences drawn against pro se litigants.
I. PRO SE LITIGATION AND LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
To evaluate liberal construction effectively, it is vital to understand
the origins and characteristics of pro se litigation generally. Recounting the roots from which the right to proceed pro se developed and
the current prevalence of pro se cases in federal court demonstrates the
importance of maintaining formidable protections against early dismissal. Moreover, dispelling common assumptions about why individuals
proceed pro se shows that their rate of dismissal may be disproportionately greater than the rate at which they file unmeritorious claims.
Thus, liberal construction has earned a reevaluation to ensure that it
properly accomplishes the goals for which it was originally established.

18

Cf. Burbank, supra note 16, at 118 (suggesting that reliance on “judicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950, invites “cognitive illiberalism,” a
phenomenon that negatively affects classes of disfavored litigants).
19
See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615 (noting that, under Conley, courts dismissed
sixty-seven percent of pro se cases).
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A. The Right to Proceed Pro Se
Like many elements of the American legal system, the ability to
civilly prosecute one’s own case has its origins in British common
20
law.
Historically, these ties were so strong, in fact, that “[t]he
Founders believed that self-representation was a basic right of a free
21
people.” As such, our early legal regimes heavily guarded the ability to proceed pro se; their commitment demonstrates both egalitarian and democratic ideals.
First, a fundamental precept of American law is that financial status
should neither determine access to courts nor substantially alter the
22
outcomes of cases. Individuals who are unable to afford attorneys
23
should not be denied a forum in which to air their grievances. To ensure that they are not, any party to a case has long been able to proceed
without a lawyer. Importantly, however, considerable “anti-lawyer sentiment” also firmly ingrained the right to self-representation into the
24
American system. This sentiment emphasizes that self-representation
safeguards were not solely intended to protect the poor’s access to
courts; they also empowered citizens of all types to have their own voices heard, rather than speaking exclusively through their lawyers.
The Sixth Amendment protects the constitutional right to
25
represent oneself as a criminal defendant. By contrast, however, the
20

See Nina Ingwer VanWormer, Help at Your Fingertips: A Twenty-First Century
Response to the Pro Se Phenomenon, 60 VAND. L. REV. 983, 987 (2007) (tracing the
right to represent oneself in federal court to medieval England, and to the Magna
Carta in particular).
21
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 830 n.39 (1975).
22
See Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 374-75 (2005)
(noting that the “American legal ideal is that both the wealthy and the pauper could
have access to the courts and could be treated equally with the resulting decisions being as fair as possible”).
23
See id. at 375 (“The development of pro se rights in the United States has been
tied to the rights of indigents to have access to the courts.”).
24
See, e.g., Faretta, 422 U.S. at 826-27 (discussing American colonists’ fervent distrust of lawyers as responsible for their insistence on maintaining the right to proceed
pro se); Jona Goldschmidt, Cases and Materials on Pro Se Litigation and Related Issues, THE
PRO SE LAW CENTER (May 1–4, 1997), http://www.pro-selaw.org/cases.asp (providing
references to research pertaining to the anti-lawyer sentiment from which the right to
self-representation emerged).
25
See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819 (“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely
that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the
right to make his defense. . . . [T]he right to self-representation . . . is thus necessarily
implied by the structure of the Amendment.”). So firm are the historical roots from
which the right to defend oneself from criminal prosecution arose that in sixteenthand seventeenth-century England, felony defendants were actually required, not just
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Supreme Court has not deemed the right to proceed pro se as a civil
litigant to be constitutionally guaranteed, despite its longstanding
26
Nevertheless,
recognition in the Anglo-American legal tradition.
Congress codified the right to proceed pro se in federal civil suits by
statute, even prior to the ratification of the Sixth Amendment. The
Judiciary Act of 1789, the right’s earliest statutory expression, pronounced “[t]hat in all the courts of the United States, the parties may
plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of
such counsel or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts re27
spectively.” And Congress has, up to the present, continually codified the statutory right to proceed pro se in the United States Code
28
using substantially similar language.
B. The Federal Pro Se Docket
1. Evidence of a Burgeoning Caseload
Although pro se litigation has been welcomed since the country’s
founding, federal courts have recently experienced a staggering inentitled, to proceed without a lawyer, despite the earlier recognition of a right to counsel in misdemeanor prosecutions and civil cases. See id. at 823 (“By common law of
that time, it was not representation by counsel but self-representation that was the
practice . . . .”). The tradition carried over into colonial America as well: “[E]ven
where counsel was permitted, the general practice continued to be self-representation
[in criminal cases].” Id. at 828.
26
See Swank, supra note 1, at 1547 (“Whatever right there is to proceed pro se in
criminal cases . . . has not been extended by the Supreme Court to civil cases.”); VanWormer, supra note 20, at 986-87 (noting that, although criminal defendants’ right to
refuse counsel is protected by the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, the guarantee
“does not extend to civil litigants”). Nonetheless, considerable debate has focused upon
whether there is a constitutional right to self-representation in civil cases, despite its
nonrecognition thus far by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 475, 484-85 (2002) (suggesting that the right to self-representation is
constitutionally guaranteed); Candice K. Lee, Note, Access Denied: Limitations on Pro Se
Litigants’ Access to Courts in the Eighth Circuit, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1261, 1265 (2003)
(commenting that courts have split on whether civil litigants have a constitutional right
to proceed self-represented). Some states, though, have definitively afforded constitutional protection to civil litigants’ right to self-representation. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. I,
§ 1, para. XII (“No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend, either
in person or by an attorney, that person’s own cause in any of the courts of this state.”);
MICH. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“A suitor in any court of this state has the right to prosecute
or defend his suit, either in his own proper person or by an attorney.”).
27
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (emphasis added).
28
See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006) (“In all courts of the United States the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . . .”).
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crease in the proportion of pro se cases on their dockets. The trend
is restricted neither to particular courts nor to certain types of suits.
Rather, it has taken hold in both district and appellate courts, in cases
involving prisoners and nonprisoners, and in claims ranging from civil
30
rights to social security.
Presently, pro se litigants appear in approximately thirty-seven
31
percent of all federal court cases. Specifically, in 2008, there were
over 70,000 pro se cases in federal district court, as compared to ap32
Unsurprisingly, prisoners
proximately 200,000 represented cases.
account for a significant part of the federal pro se docket. However,
nonprisoners still appeared pro se in a significant number of district
33
court cases in 2008—over 20,000, in fact. Thus, statistics belie the
notion that the increase in pro se litigation can solely be attributed to
prisoners’ incessant filing of habeas corpus petitions and claims under
34
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
29

See Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 439, 440-41 (2009) (describing the “inexorably rising tide of pro se litigation” in American courts); see also VanWormer, supra note 20, at 988-91 (presenting
data on the recent rise of pro se litigation in both state and federal courts).
30
See Landsman, supra note 29, at 442 (asserting that, aside from civil rights
claims, common claims pursued pro se also involved contract, labor, social security,
and tort law).
31
Swank, supra note 22, at 377 (citing Tiffany Buxton, Foreign Solutions to the U.S.
Pro Se Phenomenon, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 103, 112 (2002)).
32
See JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 78 tbl.S-23
(2008) (reporting that 70,948 pro se cases were heard in district courts in the twelve
months preceding September 30, 2008, compared to 196,309 non–pro se cases).
33
Id.
34
In fact, two relatively recent statutory developments, the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.), and the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28 and 42 U.S.C.), have severely limited
prisoners’ ability to institute abusive litigation. The PLRA, for example, requires prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before filing civil actions and pay court filing
fees in full, thereby reducing the portion of the pro se docket consisting of prisoner
complaints. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) (2006) (imposing full filing fees on prisoner
litigants); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (codifying an administrative exhaustion requirement); Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 322 (concluding that the sharp decrease in
“[t]he number of inmate-filed cases . . . following the enactment of the PLRA” demonstrates the enactment’s profound effect on pro se litigation). Even more strictly, AEDPA forbids prisoners from reinstituting previously adjudicated habeas claims. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). It also prohibits successive habeas petitions containing claims not
previously adjudicated absent approval from the relevant court of appeals and either
(1) a basis in a new constitutional rule made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court or (2) a showing that the factual predicate for the claim both could not
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Moreover, the number of pro se appeals in federal court has similarly increased in recent years to comprise a significant portion of the
federal appellate docket. For example, “nonprisoner pro se litigants
consistently accounted for approximately thirteen to fourteen percent
35
of all civil federal appeals filed annually between 1997 and 2004.”
From 2007 to 2008, though, federal courts of appeals experienced an
eight percent increase in the number of civil pro se appeals, resulting
36
in almost 20,000 in total. As a result, approximately sixty-two percent
of all civil appeals are presently pursued pro se, with approximately
37
14.5 percent involving nonprisoner pro se parties.
Clearly, then, pro se litigation shows no sign of subsiding. It will
only continue to grow as part of the federal docket, warranting an
evaluation of the reasons individuals choose to proceed pro se. Without understanding the underlying causes of the rising tide of pro se
litigation, meaningful accommodations for self-represented litigants
will continue to evade courts.
2. Reasons Litigants Represent Themselves
Demonstrating that the leniency granted to pro se pleadings is insufficient to protect meritorious claims from premature dismissal requires first dispelling the notion that pro se claims virtually always lack
merit. If they did, courts would appropriately dismiss them at rates
substantially higher than complaints submitted by counseled parties.
But the well-documented reasons individuals choose to proceed pro
se, which largely do not relate to the merits of their claims, undercut
38
the veracity of that belief.
In fact, “scholars and pro se litigants
have been developed previously and provides clear and convincing evidence that a reasonable factfinder would not have found the defendant guilty.
28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b)(2)–(3). Despite these influential developments in prisoner litigation, the
pro se docket continues to grow.
35
VanWormer, supra note 20, at 989.
36
See DUFF, supra note 32, at 45 tbl.S-4 (indicating an 8.2 percent increase from
2007 to 2008 in civil pro se appeals).
37
See id. (showing that of the 31,454 total civil appeals in 2008, 4595 involved
nonprisoners acting pro se).
38
This is not to deny that a lack of legal expertise often leads litigants to believe
they have claims when they, in fact, do not. It does, however, suggest that perhaps the
number of unmeritorious pro se filings is not as high as many assert, and perhaps not
high enough to explain the grossly disproportionate rate at which they are dismissed.
Indeed, the high rate of dismissal of pro se cases cuts against the certainty that pro se
claims lack merit because, without any discovery, it is difficult to discern the likelihood
that a claim would have been successful—precisely the reason that drafters of the Federal Rules instituted a weak pleading regime in the first place.
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themselves have identified several rational, well-considered reasons for
39
deciding to do so.”
The assumption that a vast majority of pro se suits lack merit is
primarily based upon a conception of the legal market as an accurate
filter for unmeritorious cases; good claims attract representation,
40
while bad ones do not. Under this theory, “the fact that no lawyer is
willing to take on an action for damages suggests that someone knowledgeable about the law has looked at the matter and concluded that
41
the plaintiff is unlikely to prevail.” However, this argument does not
accurately capture the reasons that individuals forego representation,
as it assumes that lawyers always accept “good” cases presented to
them and that any litigant would accept representation if made avail42
able. Neither of these assumptions holds water.
First, the most prevalent reason individuals choose to prosecute
43
their own cases is inability to afford counsel. Certainly, the use of
contingent fees mitigates to some extent the impact that lack of re-

39

VanWormer, supra note 20, at 991.
See, e.g., Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1155 (7th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)
(Posner, J., concurring) (arguing against the appointment of counsel in a pro se suit
for damages because the self-represented litigant could have hired an attorney on a
contingent-fee basis, and concluding from his failure to do so that the claim lacked
merit). For a fuller critique of this argument, see generally Robin Paul Malloy, Framing the Market: Representations of Meaning and Value in Law, Markets, and Culture, 51
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (2003).
41
Colleen McMahon, The Law of Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower
Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 851, 867 (2008).
42
See, e.g., Swank, supra note 22, at 378 (“[C]ommon belief is that all pro se civil
litigants want counsel to represent them and that no person would choose to be pro se.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)). The assumption that anyone
intending to prosecute a claim desires counsel reflects, in a more refined manner, the
saying that “one who is his own lawyer has a fool for a client.” Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 852 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Yet the myriad reasons why individuals
choose to proceed pro se in civil suits show that they may not be foolish for doing so
and certainly cannot be blamed for the decision, as it often results from their insolvency. See VanWormer, supra note 20, at 991-92 (rejecting the joke as inaccurate in light
of why individuals represent themselves). Indeed, even in the criminal context—
where the stakes are higher—the saying’s accuracy has been called into question by a
study that demonstrates that, in fact, “pro se felony defendants in state courts are convicted at rates equivalent to or lower than the conviction rates of represented felony
defendants.” Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of Self-Representation: An Empirical
Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 423 (2007).
43
See Paul D. Healey, In Search of the Delicate Balance: Legal and Ethical Questions in
Assisting the Pro Se Patron, 90 LAW LIBR. J. 129, 133 (1998) (“Ultimately, the predominant reason for self-representation may be simple economics.”); Swank, supra note 22,
at 378 (asserting that a majority of the public attributes the increase in pro se appearances to the high cost of attorneys).
40

SCHNEIDER FINAL REVISED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Illiberal Construction of Pro Se Pleadings

12/23/2010 11:44 AM

595

sources should have on acquiring counsel. However, contingent fees
do not effectively assist many claims that pro se litigants pursue, such
44
as those for injunctive relief against civil rights abuses. Additionally,
the contingent-fee structure still requires attorneys to front large sums
of money to prosecute claims, which they will not do if the projected
reward is too little (or nothing at all), despite a significant likelihood of
45
success. Furthermore, there may not exist an accessible legal market
in which a litigant can shop her claims, either because of geographical
46
47
remoteness or incarceration. Thus, proponents of the efficient-legalmarket hypothesis ignore influential factors in lawyers’ decisions regarding whether to represent prospective clients, which relate less to
their claims’ merit or likelihood of success and more to external factors.
Furthermore, a significant number of pro se litigants in fact have
funds to retain counsel, demonstrating that there are other, noneco-

44

See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 321, 326-27 (asserting that civil rights cases are
most frequently pursued pro se and that approximately thirty percent of examined pro
se cases sought a form of equitable relief). Although attorneys’ fees would presumably
be available if these types of suits are “successful,” the Supreme Court has limited the
ability of civil rights attorneys to receive attorneys’ fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See,
e.g., Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 598 (2001) (holding that attorneys cannot collect fees under the “catalyst
theory,” in which defendants voluntarily change their conduct in the way requested by
plaintiffs); see also generally 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006). As a result, attorneys are nevertheless discouraged from pursuing such suits. See Catherine R. Albiston & Laura Beth
Nielsen, The Procedural Attack on Civil Rights: The Empirical Reality of Buckhannon for the
Private Attorney General, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1087, 1089-92 (2007) (arguing that the
Court’s holding in Buckhannon discourages civil rights claims).
45
See Lee, supra note 26, at 1280-81 (doubting the market’s capacity to provide
representation when the expected profit is too insignificant to attract counsel); Swank,
supra note 22, at 380 (noting that where little or no profit motive exists, as where a potential client is a defendant or has an unprofitable case, the market will not provide
representation). In addition to not fully accounting for lawyers’ calculus in accepting
cases, the contingent-fee structure may cause parties to forego representation because
the substantial portion of an award that goes to the attorney may prevent even successful plaintiffs from being made whole. If a party feels confident in the strength of her
suit, then, she may choose to proceed without counsel in order to be more fully compensated for the injuries suffered.
46
See PATRICIA A. GARCIA, LITIGANTS WITHOUT LAWYERS: COURTS AND LAWYERS
MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF SELF-REPRESENTATION 8 (2002) (asserting that some
litigants “point to problems finding a lawyer” as a reason why they did not obtain counsel); Frances H. Thompson, Access to Justice in Idaho, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1313, 1315
(2002) (asserting that in certain rural locations, even if an individual wishes to hire an
attorney, she may not be able to find one).
47
See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 41, at 867 (excluding prisoners from the assertion that the legal market adequately determines meritorious cases because they have
“virtually no opportunity to search for counsel”).
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nomic reasons for their decisions to proceed pro se. For example,
pro se litigants have asserted that their distrust of lawyers or the legal
49
system in general drove them to forego representation. Unlike these
skeptical individuals, others who choose to prosecute claims without
counsel seem to possess a more idealistic vision of our legal system.
They believe that courts will come to the “right” or “just” result regardless of their status as unrepresented litigants, a concept from
50
which self-representation itself originated. There are numerous other factors, unrelated to merit, resulting in more litigants opting to not
hire counsel, including increased literacy rates, a heightened sense of
individualism, and the belief that litigation is simple enough to navi51
gate on one’s own. However, one remaining factor is particularly
strong in demonstrating that many pro se suits do indeed have merit:
consulted counsel often advise litigants to proceed unrepresented because they believe certain cases are easy enough for the litigants to
52
pursue without assistance.
Thus, we should not assume that most pro se suits have been reviewed by lawyers who deemed them unworthy. Rather, many of the
reasons individuals choose to act without assistance of counsel may
48

See, e.g., Bauer v. Comm’r, 97 F.3d 45, 49-50 (4th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging
that a pro se litigant had the funds and ability to obtain counsel and was therefore not
entitled to “preferential treatment”); Landsman, supra note 29, at 444-45 (emphasizing
the presence among pro se litigants of “individuals who can afford counsel but choose
not to hire a lawyer”); Swank, supra note 22, at 378 (citing a survey in which almost half
of the pro se litigants “implied that they had the necessary funds to hire an attorney,
but chose not to”); Spencer G. Park, Note, Providing Equal Access to Equal Justice: A Statistical Study of Non-Prisoner Pro Se Litigation in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California in San Francisco, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 821, 831 (1997) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of pro se litigants, 72%, were not legally ‘indigent’ . . . .”).
49
See Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the
Challenge of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 36 (2002) (discussing “antilawyer sentiment” as a reason for increased pro se litigation); Eric J.R. Nichols, Note,
Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11 Sanctions, 67 TEX. L. REV. 351, 380
(1988) (placing distrust of the legal system among the reasons why litigants choose to
proceed pro se). It seems, then, that the antilawyer sentiment partially responsible for
solidifying self-representation as an element of the Anglo-American legal tradition has
not dissipated, but rather continues to nurture its growth.
50
See Swank, supra note 22, at 379 (presenting noneconomic reasons for which
some litigants choose to represent themselves); see also supra Section I.A (discussing the
foundations upon which the right to self-representation rests, including the notion
that the retention of counsel should not substantially alter outcomes).
51
See Swank, supra note 22, at 378-79 (listing factors that in recent years have contributed to the growing inclination toward pro se litigation).
52
See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 46, at 1316 (asserting that thirty-one percent of
pro se litigants in Idaho consulted counsel, and many were advised not to obtain representation because “their case [wa]s simple enough for them to handle themselves”).
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be largely unrelated to the validity of their claims, calling into question the presumption of reduced merit that informally attaches to
pro se complaints.
3. Challenges Facing Pro Se Litigants
If more pro se litigants have potentially valid grievances than
commonly believed, there must be other factors, aside from frivolity,
that explain the grossly disproportionate rate at which their claims
are dismissed. These factors, consisting of the unique challenges
faced by litigants proceeding pro se, manifest at the pleading stage
of litigation to render their complaints more vulnerable to dismissal
53
for failure to state a claim.
First, there exists significant bias against pro se litigants in the
court system: “Pro se litigants are regularly perceived in a negative
manner; they are ‘most often attacked for the judicial inefficiencies
54
many judges, attorneys, and observers believe they create.’” As a result, they are thought to be pests responsible for “clogging” up the
55
court system. However, the evidence largely disproves these assessments. Indeed, studies have shown that cases with only represented
56
parties consumed more time than and settled at essentially the same
57
rate as their pro se counterparts. Aside from a sense that their claims
53

See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 308-09 (discussing the methods by which overburdened courts summarily dispose of pro se cases).
54
Swank, supra note 22, at 384 (quoting Buxton, supra note 31, at 114).
55
See JONA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION:
A REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS 121 (1998) (quoting
judges who expressed distaste for pro se litigants).
56
Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 358-59.
57
See, e.g., Buxton, supra note 31, at 145-46 (citing a study which found that civil
pro se claims settled at a rate “virtually identical” to that of cases with represented parties); Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 358-59 (noting that cases longest on the docket involved represented parties). The lighter burden that pro se suits impose upon courts
in comparison to counseled suits reflects not only pro se litigants’ unfamiliarity with
available litigation tactics but also the less complex nature of the claims that pro se litigants pursue. Accordingly, pro se suits are particularly good candidates for the sort of
limited, court-supervised discovery that many commentators and the Iqbal minority
have suggested as more appropriate than stringent pleading requirements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961-62 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] trial court,
responsible for managing a case, . . . can structure discovery . . . . Neither the briefs nor
the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative casemanagement tools inadequate . . . .” (citation omitted)); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1, 30 (2009) (“[A] better approach might
be to permit judges to identify those cases where additional facts are needed to support the needed inference and reserve judgment on the motion to dismiss until after
limited, focused discovery on that issue can occur.”). The discovery costs would not be
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lack merit, the perception that pro se suits are more burdensome
emanates in part from the fact that the time required to evaluate a
submission drafted by counsel is less than the time required to evaluate a document of comparable length and substance drafted by a
pro se litigant. However, submissions drafted by counsel are typically
58
longer and greater in number than those drafted by pro se litigants,
thereby negating much of the perceived inefficiency on a case-by-case
basis. Thus, pro se litigants do not overwhelmingly inhibit efficient
court practice more than others, but the belief that they do certainly
heightens the likelihood that their suits are improperly dismissed.
In addition, pro se litigants often lack a sufficient understanding of
59
procedural and substantive law to initiate a lawsuit properly. Procedural deficiencies, such as failure to file on time, are less problematic
when evaluating the effectiveness of the leeway given pro se litigants
because special treatment on procedural requirements has been, for
60
the most part, emphatically denied. As to substantive matters, however, the knowledge differential is precisely the reason for affording pro
se litigants special deference at the pleading stage of litigation. First,

crushing and would most likely be less than the costs in time and effort to courts evaluating pro se complaints, which are significant in light of the accommodations to which
they are entitled. See Buxton, supra note 31, at 117 (acknowledging the “extensive time
and effort already expended by court clerks and . . . judges in assisting pro se litigants”).
58
See, e.g., Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 359 (noting that “counseled cases generally consisted of 50% more docket entries than non-counseled cases”).
59
See VanWormer, supra note 20, at 993 (“[T]he self-represented ‘are more likely
to . . . have problems understanding and applying the procedural and substantive
law pertaining to their claim’ in the initial stages of litigation.” (footnote omitted)
(quoting Buxton, supra note 31, at 114)).
60
See, e.g., Pomales v. Celulares Telefónica, Inc., 342 F.3d 44, 49 n.4 (1st Cir. 2003)
(“[P]ro se status did not absolve [plaintiff] of the need to comply with . . . the district
court’s procedural rules.”); Creative Gifts, Inc. v. UFO, 235 F.3d 540, 549 (10th Cir.
2000) (“Although pro se litigants get the benefit of more generous treatment in some
respects, they must nonetheless follow the same rules of procedure that govern other
litigants.” (citation omitted)); Edwards v. INS, 59 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[P]ro se litigants generally are required to inform themselves regarding procedural rules and to
comply with them.”). The distinction between treatment of procedural and substantive deficiencies is not hard and fast. A small subset of federal courts have
rel[ied] upon the Supreme Court’s rationale in Haines v. Kerner to fashion a
relaxed set of pro se standards for procedural conformity, particularly when dealing with summary judgment proceedings, compliance with discovery rules, the
imposition of sanctions, and the introduction of evidence. A greater number of
courts, however, take a more traditional approach and extend . . . pleading leniency only to the substantive issues raised, while continuing to strictly enforce
compliance with procedural requirements by pro se litigants.
Buxton, supra note 31, at 118 (footnotes omitted).
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many pro se litigants have difficulty clearly conveying allegations in a
61
complaint due to their lack of legal-writing training. Thus, even if the
conduct from which a grievance arose satisfies each element of a claim,
62
illogical or unclear submissions could still result in dismissal. Similarly, a mistaken or incomplete understanding of the law can result in a
pro se litigant pleading the wrong cause of action or, alternatively, not
63
pleading an available one.
Furthermore, individuals choosing to proceed pro se because they
cannot afford legal counsel will often lack the resources to uncover
64
facts prior to filing their complaints. Consequently, these complaints
will frequently be thin on details and therefore require that courts
draw more inferences in evaluating motions to dismiss. In fact, even
those who have resources are likely to rely upon standardized forms in
drafting complaints and treat them as exemplary pleadings, which is
precisely why they are appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce65
dure. Those who do will inevitably conclude that a complaint should
be light on facts and will forego prefiling discovery to support their
66
allegations. These conclusions could very well have proven fatal to
complaints under not only the plausibility standard but even under
67
the earlier Conley standard as implemented by certain district courts.
Accordingly, nonrobust liberal construction may prevent recognition of meritorious claims by not accounting for the unique challenges

61

See Nichols, supra note 49, at 351 (acknowledging that some pro se litigants draft
illogical and rambling pleadings that are difficult to decipher).
62
See Wayne T. Westling & Patricia Rasmussen, Prisoners’ Access to the Courts: Legal
Requirements and Practical Realities, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 273, 309 (1985) (emphasizing
that poor presentation can lose a case with merit).
63
See Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U.
CHI. L. REV. 659, 678 (1988) (noting that flexible construction of pro se pleadings is
meant to combat dismissal where a cause of action exists but the complaint fails to say
the “magic words”).
64
See Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside
View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 203-04 (1972) (noting
that pro se plaintiffs are “almost totally unaware of the . . . value and techniques of pretrial discovery and investigation”).
65
See VanWormer, supra note 20, at 992 (listing the availability of legal forms as
one of the factors responsible for pro se litigants’ belief that they can successfully prosecute their cases without representation).
66
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (demonstrating the brief and general elements
that must be included in a complaint alleging negligence); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 576 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the “bare allegation[s]”
included in Form 9 of the Federal Rules).
67
See infra notes 89-91 and accompanying text (discussing district courts’ tendency
to stray from the liberal pleading regime established under Conley).
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that pro se litigants face. Therefore, liberal construction must be evaluated as actually practiced by courts to determine whether it effectively overcomes the barriers between pro se litigants and court access.
C. Liberal Construction
In recognition of the abnormally high potential for meritorious
pro se complaints to be dismissed, the Supreme Court relaxed pleading standards for pro se litigants to ensure that they receive their “day
68
in court.” In Haines v. Kerner, the Court held that judges should lib69
erally construe pro se pleadings. It further stated that
allegations such as those asserted by [the pro se] petitioner, however inartfully pleaded, are sufficient to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence. We cannot say with assurance that under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, it appears “beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would
70
entitle him to relief.”

Despite consistently affirming its holding, though, the Court has failed
to flesh out precisely how relaxed a standard lower courts should ap71
ply. Consequently, district courts apply different degrees of relaxation, thereby rendering pleading leniency less reliable at preventing
72
dismissal of pro se complaints. Nevertheless, one can discern some
unifying principles, both specific and general, from the jurisprudence
concerning pro se pleadings.

68

See Edward M. Holt, How to Treat “Fools”: Exploring the Duties Owed to Pro Se Litigants in Civil Cases, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 167, 168-69 (2001) (asserting that the Supreme
Court responded to the potential for unfair dismissal of pro se cases by requiring
judges to liberally construe pro se litigants’ complaints).
69
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). The Court has reaffirmed the lenient standard in cases following its initial pronouncement in Haines. See, e.g., Fed.
Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 128 S. Ct. 1147, 1158 (2008) (“Even in the formal litigation context, pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties.”);
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“The handwritten pro se document is to be
liberally construed.”).
70
Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
71
See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 29 (asserting that the Court “did not
define the degree of relaxation” applicable to pro se complaints).
72
See id. at 29-30 (“Not surprisingly, federal courts take varying approaches regarding ‘how liberal’ the construction of pro se pleadings should be.”); Douglas A.
Blaze, Presumed Frivolous: Application of Stringent Pleading Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 971-72 (1990) (concluding that lower courts have
frequently ignored or given only “superficial acknowledgment” to the requirement
that pro se pleadings be liberally construed).
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1. The Method by Which Courts Liberally Construe
Pro Se Complaints
It is difficult to survey all of the ways by which lower courts operationalize liberal construction because of the vague terms in which the
73
Supreme Court articulated its directive. Nevertheless, two general
lower court techniques are clear: (1) disregard as much as possible
pro se litigants’ use of incomprehensible language and incorrect
grammar in setting forth allegations and (2) intuit from their allegations the appropriate legal claims or procedural devices that pro se li74
tigants would have expressly invoked had they been counseled.
However, there are obvious limits upon the extent to which courts will

73

Indeed, lower court opinions often give only cursory mention of the method by
which they implement liberal construction in a “standard of review” section without
specific explanation of how it is given effect when particular allegations are evaluated.
See, e.g., Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp. 2d 743, 759-60 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (acknowledging the liberal construction afforded a pro se complaint in its “standard of review”
section, but failing to make further mention of the doctrine in discussion, despite concluding that many of the asserted claims should be dismissed).
74
See, e.g., Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (describing liberal construction as requiring the court to read the pleadings to state a valid claim if reasonable, despite, among other things, a pro se litigant’s “confusion of various legal
theories” and “poor syntax and sentence construction”). That both of these concessions would be misguided and unfair to the opposition if a pro se complaint were
drafted with the aid of counsel—albeit undisclosed—explains courts’ strong disapproval of the practice that has come to be known as “ghostwriting.” See, e.g., Delso v.
Trs. for the Ret. Plan for the Hourly Emps. of Merck & Co., No. 04-3009, 2007 WL
766349, at *16-17 (D.N.J. Mar. 6, 2007) (concluding that a lawyer’s informal assistance
to a pro se litigant in drafting a court document violated the lawyer’s ethical obligations because it provided the litigant undue advantage in light of the leeway afforded
pro se litigants). Permitting limited-scope representations, or “unbundled” legal services, is one oft-suggested way to deal with the undue advantage gained when lawyers
assist in drafting documents submitted pro se without disclosing their participation to
the court. See, e.g., Michael W. Loudenslager, Giving Up the Ghost: A Proposal for Dealing
with Attorney “Ghostwriting” of Pro Se Litigants’ Court Documents Through Explicit Rules Requiring Disclosure and Allowing Limited Appearance for Such Attorneys, 92 MARQ. L. REV.
103, 105 (2008). Allowing limited assistance in this fashion could curtail the extra effort demanded of courts when considering pro se complaints drafted with the assistance of counsel because the complaints would be less difficult to decipher. It would
also thereby allay concerns over less meritorious complaints surviving motions to dismiss merely because of the leeway afforded to them. See Jeffrey P. Justman, Note, Capturing the Ghost: Expanding Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to Solve Procedural Concerns
with Ghostwriting, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1246, 1287 (2008) (recommending an amendment
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 that would allow for limited-scope representation
and suggesting that such an amendment would make representation more accessible
to pro se litigants).
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liberally construe pro se complaints—one of which is the dilution of
75
factual allegations needed to state a claim.
Disparity in the writing capabilities of pro se litigants and
represented parties can lead to different rulings on motions to dismiss
even when the plaintiffs’ grievances arise from identical factual cir76
cumstances. This is because the style in which allegations are presented affects their clarity, which, in turn, influences whether judges
can discern cognizable legal claims from them. A complaint drafted
by a lawyer will likely set forth in neutral language the necessary allegations to state a claim effectively—time, place, specific sequence of
events—and end with a prayer for relief. By contrast, if the complaint
is drafted without assistance of counsel, it will likely be tainted by emotional language, legal jargon, tangents, and less direct or incompre77
hensible assertions of fact. Accordingly, courts attempt to mitigate
the impact that pro se litigants’ “inartful” drafting may have on the
adequacy of their complaints with the first form of liberal construction: to the extent possible, pro se allegations should be read only for
substance, disregarding poor style, vocabulary, syntax, superfluities,
78
and the like. Courts, then, must discern from the allegations the fac79
tual scenario that the plaintiff intended to allege.
A complaint that references laws under which the allegations provide no relief may also be subject to dismissal. Presumably, such dismis75

See, e.g., Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (noting that liberal construction does not prevent pro se litigants from having to allege sufficient facts to state a claim).
76
See Westling & Rasmussen, supra note 62, at 309 (“There is no doubt that a good
case can be lost by poor presentation. . . . Even an otherwise meritorious claim can become lost in a tangle of facts, extraneous material, unsupported assertions, and fallacious
arguments.”); Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 64, at 181-82 (acknowledging the negative
effect that pro se litigants’ “inability to communicate effectively in writing” can have on
their complaints, often leading to dismissal for being “rambling and conclusory”).
77
See Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 64, at 182 n.91 (discussing the “emotional
distortions” in many pro se pleadings, as well as their tendency to “slip into an imitation of legal jargon copied from other sources”).
For example, a civil rights complaint . . . may begin in flamboyant, legalsounding rhetoric with a series of broad generalizations about civil and human rights. At some point the complainant may state conclusorily that he was
“brutally beaten by the guard” and then, with renewed vigor, launch into frenzied attacks on prison conditions in general.
Id. at 182.
78
See, e.g., Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110 (listing “poor syntax and sentence construction” as
two flaws that should be overlooked in evaluating the sufficiency of pro se complaints).
79
See, e.g., Ayres v. Ellis, No. 09-4247, 2009 WL 3681892, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 4,
2009) (quoting a pro se complaint’s unclear factual averments and extracting from
them the facts that the pro se litigant “meant to allege”).
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sal is proper when a reasonably competent lawyer drafts the complaint
because the lawyer would have invoked a different law had one been
more advantageous to the client’s case. However, that same presumption is less tenable with respect to complaints drafted by pro se litigants
because of the challenges faced by laypersons in comprehending legal
doctrines and recognizing available legal theories upon which to base
claims. Acknowledging that pro se litigants frequently have a flawed or
incomplete understanding of the law, courts have supplemented their
disregard for stylistic deficiencies with a more “activist” form of liberal
construction: to the extent possible, courts should restructure a complaint to invoke the most appropriate legal bases suggested by the alle80
For example, one plaintiff who asserted that the parole
gations.
commission’s disregard of its own process regulations was unfair had
81
his complaint interpreted as a procedural due process claim. Thus,
courts may construe a complaint to invoke the substantive law under
which the allegations have the best chance of stating a claim, even if
the plaintiff has asserted violations under an inapplicable law or failed
82
to expressly assert any particular legal claim whatsoever.
Beyond simply targeting challenges pro se litigants face, the two
techniques by which courts liberally construe pro se complaints seek
to extract what the litigants would have presented had they retained
80

See, e.g., Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2002) (construing
a pro se complaint to make the best arguments that the allegations suggest); Franklin
v. Rose, 765 F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985) (providing a pro se petition for habeas corpus
an “active interpretation” to “encompass any allegation stating federal relief” (quoting
White v. Wyrick, 530 F.2d 818, 819 (8th Cir. 1976) (per curiam))).
81
See Lee v. Rios, No. 08-5330, 2010 WL 22328, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2010)
(“Thus, this Court should construe his argument that he was ‘deprived . . . of the fundamental fairness in the parole voting process’ as an assertion that the Commission violated
his right to procedural due process.” (omission in original) (citation omitted)).
82
See, e.g., Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 713 (6th Cir. 2004) (construing a civil
rights claim to be instead a habeas petition because that was the only viable claim
based upon the allegations set forth in the complaint). Judge Bacharach and Professor
Entzeroth take issue with the judicial practice of reading into pro se complaints claims
“fairly [but perhaps not explicitly] raised.” Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 3241. To illustrate the flaws in such an approach, they point to how it conflicts with the
statutory schemes created by the PLRA and AEDPA. Id. at 35-41. For example, if a
judge reads into a pro se complaint a claim as to which the plaintiff did not exhaust
administrative remedies, the practice may lead to dismissal of the entire action under
the PLRA. Id. at 34. In addition, if a judge construes a civil rights complaint as a habeas petition that ultimately fails, the pro se litigant then faces nearly insurmountable
hurdles under AEDPA to filing a successive petition for habeas relief. Id. at 37. To the
authors, these pitfalls suggest that activist approaches toward pro se litigants should be
constrained because they often punish intended beneficiaries. See id. at 41 (“With this
intangible loss of a judge’s neutrality, the courts may be creating unintended penalties
for the litigants who the courts are paradoxically trying to help.”).
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83

counsel. However, the Supreme Court has never stated that these
techniques are correct. Indeed, the language with which it articulated the leniency afforded to pro se pleadings hints at an alternative—albeit significantly broader—theory behind liberal construction. Just what that theory is, and whether it is viable, is the topic of
the following subsection.
2. The Theory Behind Liberal Construction
Despite its failure to expressly set forth a coherent theory pursuant to which lower courts should liberally construe pro se complaints, the Supreme Court has provided them a modicum of guidance on the general meaning of liberal construction. The best
description one can discern is that liberal construction is simply an
84
exaggerated version of the Conley “no set of facts” standard. In fact,
each pronouncement of the relaxed pleading standard is accompanied by the Conley Court’s instruction not to dismiss a claim unless it is
“beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would
85
entitle him to relief.” Justice Scalia confirmed this understanding
when he asserted that “[l]iberal construction of pro se pleadings is
merely an embellishment of the notice-pleading standard set forth in
86
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”
87
As an exaggerated form of transsubstantive notice pleading,
then, liberal construction’s efficacy as a less stringent standard largely
depends upon lower courts’ adherence to a simplified pleading regime. At least in theory, because plaintiffs could easily surpass the
83

See id. at 43-44 (suggesting that a pro se litigant’s intent should be the hallmark
of the leeway granted her complaint).
84
See Bradlow, supra note 63, at 681-82 (discussing development of the Haines approach in relation to Conley and concluding that the “ultimate result is a less stringent
interpretation of what is itself a very lax standard”); see also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S.
41, 45-46 (1957) (articulating the “no set of facts” standard).
85
See, e.g., Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980) (per curiam) (observing that
“it is settled law that the allegations of [a pro se] complaint . . . are held to ‘less stringent standards’” and noting that such complaints “should not be dismissed for failure
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief” (citations omitted)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam))).
86
Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 386 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
87
See Fairman, supra note 9, at 988 (describing notice pleading as a touchstone of
the Federal Rules, merely requiring that a “plaintiff provide a short and plain statement of a claim sufficient to put the defendant on notice” in order to survive a motion to dismiss).
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threshold to discovery, the Court appears to have believed liberal
construction did not need to take such a robust form. Lower courts
followed the Supreme Court’s lead by focusing less on liberalizing
the actual standard of sufficiency and more on mitigating the effect
of pro se litigants’ reduced capacity to draft understandable and le88
gally accurate complaints. However, pre-Twombly, those lower courts
demonstrated a propensity to stray from the liberal standard the draf89
ters of the Federal Rules envisioned.
Most significantly, district
courts deciding Rule 12(b)(6) motions appropriated the ability to
parse a complaint’s factual allegations into “conclusory” averments
that should be disregarded and other statements entitled to consid90
Additionally, courts often insisted that plaintiffs
eration as true.
plead facts in support of their claims in order to survive a motion to
91
dismiss. That these devices ran contrary to notice pleading is demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s consistent reversal of lower court
92
decisions displaying their use.
88

See supra subsection I.C.1 (discussing the ways by which lower courts implement
liberal construction in practice).
89
See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 567-68 (noting that lower courts often disregarded the Supreme Court’s explicit instructions to apply lenient notice pleading
standards, instead insisting on heightened pleading requirements, particularly in
civil rights cases).
90
See Marcus, supra note 13, at 466-71 (discussing courts’ tendency to label some
factual allegations conclusory and thereby require more supporting evidence for them
to be sufficient).
91
See Fairman, supra note 9, at 1011-59 (documenting lower courts’ insistence that
complaints contain greater factual specificity in various fields of law, including antitrust, environmental, and civil rights).
92
See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002) (reversing a
lower court ruling that employment discrimination complaints must allege “specific
facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination” and holding that they must only
present “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief” (citation omitted)). Notably, however, the Court’s recent rulings in Twombly
and Iqbal have called the continuing vitality of Swierkiewicz into question. See, e.g., Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) (“We have to conclude . . . that because Conley has been specifically repudiated by both Twombly and Iqbal, so too has Swierkiewicz, at least insofar as it concerns pleading requirements and
relies on Conley.”); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (declaring
that, as a result of the similarities between the new motion to dismiss and the motion
for summary judgment, Swierkiewicz “effectively may be dead”). Nevertheless, in neither case did the Supreme Court specifically overturn its decision in Swierkiewicz. See
Thomas, supra, at 36 (acknowledging that “Iqbal and Twombly did not expressly overrule Swierkiewicz”). In fact, the Court cited it approvingly in Twombly, which together
with other commonalities between the two cases—among them, endorsement of a fairnotice principle in Rule 8(a)—suggest that Swierkiewicz is still good law. Compare Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (asserting that Rule 8(a)(2) only re-

SCHNEIDER FINAL REVISED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

606

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

12/23/2010 11:44 AM

[Vol. 159: 585

Thus, lacking a cohesive articulation of a more liberal standard by
which to judge the sufficiency of pro se allegations—and ostensibly relying upon generally liberal pleading to ensure its efficacy—liberal
construction did not compensate for the historical end run around
93
notice pleading. And certainly, the challenges confronting pro se
litigants could only have exacerbated their vulnerability to the devices
lower courts used to dismiss more complaints, despite judicial efforts
94
to overlook them. Approximately sixty-seven percent of pro se com95
plaints were dismissed under Conley, clear evidence of this reality.
These statistics show that the mantra “dismissal of a pro se claim as insufficiently pleaded is appropriate only in the most unsustainable of
96
cases” may be mere lip service.
This reality, though, has been significantly altered by the sea
change in pleading practice inspired by Twombly and Iqbal. Since the
97
decisions retired Conley’s “no set of facts” standard, upon which liberal construction relied, the practice too may have earned its retirement. As the following discussion shows, Conley provided a superior—
albeit flawed—background standard for liberal construction to protect pro se litigants as compared to the new plausibility standard.

quires “a short and plain statement” to “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests” (citation omitted)), with Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514 (noting that the complaint satisfies the requirements of Rule 8(a)
because it gives fair notice to the defendant).
93
See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil Rights Cases and the Provision of
Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 443 (1993) (concluding from a review of reported district court and court of appeals decisions that many courts have applied stringent
pleading standards to pro se complaints).
94
See Section II.B for a more in-depth explanation of how the conflagration of
challenges facing pro se litigants post-Iqbal renders liberal construction an ineffective
bulwark against improper dismissals for failure to state a claim.
95
Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615.
96
Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 216 (2d Cir. 2008) (emphasis added). Interestingly, the complaint in Boykin was quite similar to the one dismissed in Iqbal. In Boykin, an African American woman alleged that a lender denied her home-equity loan
application on account of her race, sex, and neighborhood. Id. at 206. In her complaint, she did not state specific factual allegations to support the claim of discriminatory motive, instead alleging it generally based upon “information and belief.” Id. at
214 (citation omitted). The Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the complaint for
failure to state a claim, noting that the general averment was sufficient for Rule 8(a)
purposes. Id. at 215. Whether the same decision would have resulted after Iqbal is unclear; however, the court’s strong emphasis on the leeway granted pro se complaints,
even under Twombly, lends hope for more robust liberal construction of the sort proposed herein.
97
See, e.g., Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562-63 (holding that the “no set of facts” standard
has earned its retirement and “is best forgotten”).
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II. PLAUSIBILITY AND PRO SE PLEADINGS
In Twombly, the Supreme Court announced the new plausibility
standard by which pleadings are to be judged: a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
98
face.” A facially plausible complaint is one that “raise[s] a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the alleged
99
wrongdoing. However, despite affirming the Twombly decision, Iqbal
substantially bolstered plausibility as a device by which lower courts
100
Iqbal is the focus of the
can dismiss weak, not just meritless, cases.
98

Id. at 570. For an interesting account of the origins of plausibility, see Edward
Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the Symposium
on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3-9 (2010). Professor Brunet traces
the origins of the word “plausible” to antitrust litigation, in which the Court used the
term substantively to evaluate whether a conspiracy claim made “economic sense.” Id.
at 4. According to him, “[b]ecause of the prior substantive use of plausibility it seems
highly questionable to re-use this term as a new procedural standard for assessing Rule
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. . . . Plausibility as a standard to test pleadings seems confused and should be scrapped.” Id. at 14.
99
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
100
See Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 852 (2010) (“Iqbal applies a thick screening
model that aims to screen weak as well as meritless suits, whereas Twombly applies a
thin screening model that aims to screen only truly meritless suits.”). This is certainly
not the only significant change brought about by the Court’s decision in Iqbal. In addition to its ruling with respect to pleading standards, the Iqbal Court eliminated the possibility of supervisory liability in Bivens claims, which are made against federal officials
for constitutional violations. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (refuting the petitioner’s contention that officials can be made liable under Bivens pursuant
to a theory of supervisory liability and holding that “each Government official . . . is
only liable for his or her own misconduct”); see also generally Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (providing a private
remedy for violations of the Fourth Amendmet by federal agents). This will no doubt
cause shockwaves in lower courts, which, prior to Iqbal, acknowledged forms of supervisory liability in Bivens actions, despite the well-established precedent that such claims
cannot be based upon respondeat superior. See, e.g., Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991,
995 (11th Cir. 2003) (discussing the standard for supervisory liability in a Bivens action); Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2000) (acknowledging that in
Bivens actions, supervisory liability exists only when “there is subordinate liability” and
“the supervisor’s action or inaction was affirmatively linked to the constitutional violation caused by the subordinate” (quoting Aponte Matos v. Toledo-Dávila, 135 F.3d 182,
192 (1st Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); White v. Downs, No. 95-2177,
1997 WL 210858, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 1997) (per curiam) (“Although there is no
respondeat superior liability in Bivens actions, a supervisor c[an] be held liable for the acts
of a subordinate . . . .” (citations omitted)). Whether the Court should even have decided the issue is questionable because both parties agreed on the availability of supervisory liability and the standard pursuant to which it should be judged, such that the
question was not presented to the Court. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1956-58 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the majority “sua sponte decide[d] the scope of supervisory
liability” despite the parties’ agreement on the issue). The absence of full briefing and
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inquiry here because the Court’s two-pronged approach to plausibility
analysis systematically exploits pro se litigants’ vulnerabilities to dismiss their seemingly weak suits.
A. Ashcroft v. Iqbal
1. Background and Prior History
Following the September 11th terrorist attacks, federal authori101
ties arrested and detained Javaid Iqbal, a Pakistani citizen.
After
pleading guilty to charges of fraud in connection with identification
documents, Iqbal was released from detention and subsequently re102
moved to Pakistan. In May 2004, he commenced a suit in the Eastern District of New York against numerous federal officials, including
former Attorney General John Ashcroft and current FBI Director Ro103
bert Mueller.
Iqbal’s complaint concerned his seven-month confinement under
104
highly restrictive conditions.
Iqbal alleged that federal authorities
designated him a person “of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin” in violation of the First and Fifth Amend105
Specifically, he alleged that the FBI, under Mueller’s direcments.
tion, arrested and detained “‘thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as
106
He further
part of its investigation of the events of September 11.’”
alleged that, in discussions with Mueller, Ashcroft authorized a “policy
of holding post–September 11th detainees in highly restrictive condi107
tions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI.” Last, Iqbal
averred that Mueller and Ashcroft “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him and others to harsh condiargument on the Bivens issue may undercut the precedential effect of the Court’s elimination of supervisory liability. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 305 & n.94 (9th ed. 2007) (noting that “decisions explained in a written opinion
but rendered without full briefing and argument” are not entitled to as much weight as
decisions that are “fully articulated”).
101
See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147-49 (2d Cir. 2007) (recounting Iqbal’s arrest
by the FBI and INS, as well as his subsequent detention in the Metropolitan Detention
Center), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
102
See Burbank, supra note 16, at 114 (detailing the facts preceding Iqbal’s complaint, including a guilty plea leading to his removal to Pakistan).
103
Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 149; Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01809, 2005 WL 2375202,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005).
104
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943-44.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal’s complaint).
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tions “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [their] religion, race,
108
and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.”
Mueller and Ashcroft moved to dismiss the allegations against
109
them for failure to state a claim. Pre-Twombly, the district court denied their motion, invoking the Conley standard to assert that, accepting the allegations as true, it could not conclude that there was no set
of facts that would entitle Iqbal to relief against Mueller and Ash110
croft. The defendants then pursued an interlocutory appeal in the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed the district
court’s denial of the motion to dismiss in light of Twombly, decided
111
just several months prior.
The Second Circuit held that Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft
112
and Mueller satisfied the plausibility standard.
It interpreted Twombly as instituting “a flexible ‘plausibility standard’” that only demands
further factual support for claims where the context alone does not
113
According to Judge
render inferences of wrongdoing plausible.
Newman, no additional factual “amplification” was needed to render
114
Iqbal’s claims against Ashcroft and Mueller plausible. The allegation
that the defendants condoned and agreed to the discrimination was
plausible “because of the likelihood that these senior officials would
have concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation
of policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested . . . and des115
ignated ‘of high interest’ in the aftermath of 9/11.”
2. The Supreme Court’s Two-Pronged Approach
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision on the
claims of discrimination against Ashcroft and Mueller in a five-to-four
108

Id.
Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-01809, 2005 WL 2375202, at *17 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 27, 2005).
110
Id. at *29.
111
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1942 (describing the procedural history in the lower courts).
112
See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Applying the normal
pleading rules . . . , even as supplemented by the plausibility standard, we have no
doubt that the Plaintiff’s allegations . . . suffice to withstand a motion to dismiss.”),
rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
113
See id. at 157-58 (emphasizing that a pleader need only “amplify a claim with
some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible”).
114
See id. at 166 (“Plaintiff’s allegations . . . are entirely plausible, without allegations of additional subsidiary facts.”).
115
Id. at 175-76.
109

SCHNEIDER FINAL REVISED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

610

12/23/2010 11:44 AM

[Vol. 159: 585

116

decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held that Iqbal’s
complaint failed to adequately allege a plausible claim that the highranking officials acted for the purpose of discriminating on account of
117
race, religion, or national origin. The two-step process by which the
majority arrived at that conclusion, however, vastly expanded Twombly
118
beyond what its author, Justice Souter, intended.
First, the Court instructed lower courts considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to ignore allegations that are, in fact, conclusions
119
and therefore not entitled to a presumption of truth. Despite attributing this maneuver to Iqbal’s plausibility predecessor, Twombly, Justice Kennedy extended its scope to include not only “legal conclu120
Thus,
sions” but also “threadbare” or “bald” factual allegations.
even factual averments or mixed statements of law and fact can be
ignored in determining a complaint’s plausibility if a judge deems
121
them deficient of adequate specificity. Additionally, the Court eva-

116

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954.
See id. at 1952 (holding that the complaint did not contain facts plausibly showing the petitioners’ purposeful adoption of a discriminatory policy).
118
See id. at 1955 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The majority then misapplies the
pleading standard under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly to conclude that the complaint
fails to state a claim.” (citation omitted)); see also Burbank, supra note 16, at 115
(commenting that Iqbal’s “mischief” is likely a “major source of regret for the author
of the Twombly decision”).
119
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (majority opinion) (asserting that a court need not
accept as true “mere conclusory statements”). Notably, the Court did not outright
“cast aside the assumption-of-truth rule, which holds that a claimant’s factual allegations are entitled to be believed and accepted at the pleading stage.” A. Benjamin
Spencer, Iqbal and the Slide Toward Restrictive Procedure, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 185,
192 (2010) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). However, the
Court’s treatment of the allegations in Iqbal’s complaint does question the rule’s vitality going forward. Id. Indeed, one commentator has characterized the plausibility inquiry as secondary to the first step at which certain allegations are ignored. See Adam
N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1314 (2010) (asserting that
the “‘plausibility’ inquiry is not in fact the primary inquiry at the pleadings phase” and
suggesting that it “becomes irrelevant if a plaintiff provides nonconclusory allegations
for each element of a claim for relief”).
120
Compare Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007) (concluding that
the complaint’s “stray” allegations of illegal “agreement” were “merely legal conclusions”), with Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (dismissing repondent’s allegations regarding petitioners’ knowledge as “bare” and “conclusory”).
121
See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009) (statement of Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189 (under “Witness Testimony”) (noting that the Court
claimed the power to “carve a complaint” by ignoring some allegations of fact and
mixed allegations of law and fact as conclusory); Bone, supra note 100, at 860-61 (con117
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luated each allegation in the complaint individually to determine if
122
they were specific enough to warrant a presumption of truth.
Again, this disregarded Justice Souter’s consideration of the Twombly
complaint as a whole before concluding that its “general allegations
of agreement were intended to be [legal] conclusions based on paral123
lel conduct alleged elsewhere.”
Once a court has “weeded out” the allegations that can be ignored
124
for the purposes of deciding a motion to dismiss, it is instructed to
determine if the remaining factual allegations “plausibly suggest an
125
entitlement to relief.”
“[J]udicial experience and common sense”
act as guides in considering whether, in light of competing inferences
that can be drawn from the allegations, the plaintiff’s theory of
126
Although this step in the analysis largely
wrongdoing is plausible.
parallels the approach in Twombly, there is a significant difference
that bears highlighting: courts have extensive experience with gener127
ic antitrust suits, but not claims of the sort put forth by Javaid Iqbal.
cluding that the Iqbal Court’s approach to differentiating between conclusory and
nonconclusory facts is based upon the level of generality at which they are stated).
122
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (dismissing allegations as conclusory without discussion of other allegations to which they are related); see also Rakesh N. Kilaru, Comment, The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 905, 913 (2010) (“To Justice Kennedy, each allegation must stand or fall on its
own . . . .”).
123
Bone, supra note 100, at 859; see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1960 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that singling out certain allegations from a complaint as a whole is a
“fallacy” inhering in the majority’s approach).
124
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (majority opinion).
125
Id. at 1951.
126
Id. at 1950; see also Burbank, supra note 16, at 118 (characterizing the Court’s
analysis as a necessarily comparative one in which judges imagine, based on their predispositions, other possible explanations for the allegations included in a complaint).
In evaluating motions to dismiss, courts are confined to reviewing facts in the complaint, documents referred to therein, and facts of which judicial notice is taken. See
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (“[C]ourts must
consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take
judicial notice.”). Thus, courts’ consideration of competing inferences made from
neither the plaintiff’s pleadings nor the defendant’s responses thereto—considered
sua sponte, if you will—suggests that their analysis may extend beyond the proper
scope of a Rule 12(b)(6) determination.
127
See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, supra note 121, at 12
(“Twombly involved assessing competing inferences in a well-trodden path of antitrust
law, [but] in Iqbal the Court was at sea, subjecting the competing inferences, most of
which were left to the [J]ustices’ imaginations, to an implicit comparative exercise.”);
see also Bone, supra note 100, at 877 (characterizing Iqbal’s story as “unusual enough to
suggest something fishy might be going on”).
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This results in greater reliance upon values than experience, despite
the latter being perhaps more prudent. If a judge finds an opposing
inference of lawful conduct by a defendant significantly more plausi128
ble, she should dismiss the claim.
The Court proceeded to apply its novel two-pronged approach to
129
Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller.
The Court excluded several critical averments included in the complaint, the most
notable of which alleged that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to harsh
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of
130
Thus, the Court con[his] religion, race, and/or national origin.”
sidered only allegations asserting (1) that the pair agreed on the policy of restrictively detaining 9/11 suspects and (2) that the FBI implemented the policy under Mueller’s direction. These, according to the
Court, failed to “nudge” the claim of discriminatory purpose from
131
Competing inferences of lawful intent
“conceivable to plausible.”
rendered the alternative pressed by Iqbal implausible; defendants, in
other words, more likely sought to keep Iqbal in secure conditions be132
cause he was a suspected terrorist, not because of his Pakistani origin.
B. Iqbal’s Impact on Pro Se Pleadings
The Supreme Court drastically altered federal pleading practice
by supplanting Conley’s low-threshold, “no set of facts” standard with
128

See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951-52 (concluding that, given more likely and obvious explanations for defendants’ conduct, the allegations failed to raise a plausible
inference of wrongdoing).
129
Professor Spencer’s analysis of the Court’s treatment of Iqbal’s supposedly
“conclusory” allegations suggests that the plausibility inquiry does not even involve two
distinct steps:
At bottom . . . the Court’s rejection of certain factual allegations as “too conclusory” is really a statement that (1) the allegations are factual claims that assert the unexpected, particularly about certain kinds of defendants . . . ; (2) as
such, the allegations require additional supporting facts to be believed; and
(3) such facts are lacking in the claimant’s statement of his claim.
Spencer, supra note 119, at 196. However, the initial step in Professor Spencer’s deconstruction of Iqbal’s approach involves a question of believability, or what many
would term “plausibility.”
130
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131
Id. at 1952 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
132
See id. at 1951-52 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567) (emphasizing that a policy of
targeting suspected terrorists and housing them in a restrictive environment is an
“obvious alternative explanation,” which only suggests disparate impact and not discriminatory purpose).
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133

Iqbal’s new plausibility standard.
The change demands that the
Court’s instruction to construe pro se complaints liberally similarly be
reevaluated, if not concomitantly altered, because it is an elaboration
134
Thus, the following section considers
of the now-retired standard.
whether in theory liberal construction survives Iqbal, and whether in
practice it accommodates the resulting change in pleading doctrine to
135
protect meritorious pro se complaints from premature dismissal.
1. The Minimal Assurance Provided Pro Se Litigants
by Erickson v. Pardus
On the heels of its decision in Twombly, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in Erickson v. Pardus, which involved a pro
136
se complaint. Although the Court reemphasized the special solicitude granted pro se pleadings—thereby confirming liberal construction’s survival post-plausibility—the case provides little comfort that
pro se litigants have adequate access to courts under the new plead137
ing regime.
133

Herrmann, Beck & Burbank, supra note 4, at 148 (Burbank, Rebuttal) (arguing that, rather than clarifying pleading standards, the recent pleading decisions
“changed them”).
134
Unfortunately, commentators have given this relatively glaring development
only casual, passing consideration. See, e.g., Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at
29-32 (noting that the new plausibility standard will change the extent to which courts
liberally evaluate pro se complaints because it increases the subjectivity of the analysis).
135
Scholars have similarly singled out other types of cases for reevaluation in light
of Twombly and Iqbal, concluding that the new plausibility standard is so poor a fit for
such cases that an entirely different standard is necessary. See, e.g., Joseph A. Seiner,
The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination
Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1041-50 (proposing a new pleading standard to replace plausibility for evaluating employment discrimination complaints).
136
551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The acceptance of such an unremarkable
case and the timing of its decision suggest that the Supreme Court sought to maintain, as one critic put it, “deniability”: the capacity to check excessive usages of plausibility to give the appearance of maintaining a consistent pleading doctrine. See Editorial, The Devil in the Details, 91 JUDICATURE 52, 54 (2007) (“More probably, Twombly
is an exercise in strategic ambiguity that empowers the lower federal courts to tighten
pleading . . . while preserving deniability . . . [by] correct[ing] perceived excesses (as
in Erickson).”); Amy Howe, More on Yesterday’s Decision in No. 06-7317, Erickson v. Pardus, SCOTUSBLOG ( June 5, 2007, 5:10 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/06/
more-on-yesterdays-decision-in-no-06-7317-erickson-v-pardus (suggesting that the
Court’s decision was meant to “counteract the impression” that Twombly heightened
pleading standards).
137
Whether plausibility analysis applied at all to pro se pleadings was in question
in the wake of Erickson. See, e.g., Anthony Martinez, Case Note, Plausibility Among the
Circuits: An Empirical Survey of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 61 ARK. L. REV. 763, 775
(2009) (“Erickson implies that the Twombly standard may not be applicable to a com-
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William Erickson, a Colorado inmate, filed a pro se complaint
against prison officials, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment
138
rights. Specifically, Erickson, unaided by counsel, averred that
prison officials had diagnosed him as requiring treatment for hepatitis
C; that he had been placed in an appropriate treatment program; that
shortly after the program commenced the prison[] doctor removed him
from the program in violation of the applicable protocol; that prison officials refused to recommence his treatment despite his eligibility; and
that, in the meantime, he was suffering irreversible damage to his liver
139
and risking possible death.

Nonetheless, the district court granted the defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss because Erickson failed to allege adequately that the
doctor’s discontinuance of treatment caused the harm, rather than the
140
hepatitis C. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed, further characterizing the allegations of independent harm as “conclu141
Each court paid
sory” and therefore “insufficient to state a claim.”
142
lip service to the special solicitude afforded pro se pleadings, but,
alas, the leniency did not rescue Erickson’s complaint in either venue.
The Supreme Court, however, did save the complaint, summarily
reversing the lower court decisions because Erickson’s allegations
143
were not too conclusory to satisfy federal pleading requirements.
Despite having decided Twombly just two weeks earlier, though, the
plaint filed by a pro se plaintiff.”). However, this seems to have been wishful thinking,
because lower courts overwhelmingly cite the new standard when considering pro se
complaints. See, e.g., Severin v. Parish of Jefferson, 357 F. App’x 601, 603 (5th Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (applying the plausibility standard to a pro se complaint); Grabauskas v. CIA, 354 F. App’x 576, 576-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (dismissing a pro se complaint
for failing to raise a plausible inference of wrongdoing).
138
See Complaint at 3, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (No. 05-0405) (per
curiam), 2005 WL 5543460 (claiming that prison staff were deliberately indifferent to
plaintiff’s medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
139
Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice,
243 F.R.D. 604, 636 (2007) (citing Complaint, supra note 138, at 3).
140
See Erickson v. Pardus, 198 Fed. App’x 694, 698 (10th Cir. 2006) (recounting
the basis for the district court’s dismissal of the pro se complaint), vacated, Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam).
141
See id. (explaining that Erickson’s complaint included only conclusory allegations regarding an independent cognizable harm from the doctors removing him
from treatment).
142
See, e.g., id. at 696 (noting that a “pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed
liberally” but that a court “is not required to assume the role of advocate” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted)).
143
See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (concluding that it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the allegations of independent harm as conclusory).
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Supreme Court made no mention of the plausibility standard.
Instead, the Court emphasized that the allegations satisfied Rule 8(a)(2)
by giving “the defendant[s] fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
145
grounds upon which it rests.” Notably, the Court did not rely upon
Erickson’s pro se status to deem his complaint adequate, noting only
that the departure from established rules of pleading was more pro146
nounced because of the leniency to which that status entitled him.
Despite Erickson’s reaffirmation that lower courts must liberally
147
construe pro se complaints, the decision fails to allay concerns over
liberal construction’s efficacy post-plausibility. This is because Erickson’s complaint, irrespective of the Court’s failure to so state, satisfied
148
Erickson raised a
Twombly’s version of the plausibility standard.
plausible inference of independent, cognizable harm by asserting that
the prison doctor’s deliberate cessation of treatment endangered his
149
life. The opinion, then, does not demonstrate that an otherwise too
thinly pleaded complaint could be rendered substantively sufficient by
liberally construing it since Erickson’s pro se status did not influence
150
This shortcoming supports the notion that liberal
the decision.
construction only includes a set of devices to deal with challenges

144

See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 573 (“The [Erickson] Court did not even refer to
the ‘plausibility’ standard . . . .”); Ides, supra note 139, at 639 (noting that the Erickson
Court only cited Twombly twice for propositions unrelated to plausibility).
145
Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007)). Although the Court correctly deemed the complaint sufficient to survive a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it confused the notice-giving requirements of 12(e) with the
requirements of substantive sufficiency in 12(b)(6). See Burbank, supra note 16, at 114
(implying that notice is irrelevant under Rule 12(b)(6) and is properly considered under Rule 12(e)); Ides, supra note 139, at 637-38 (suggesting that a problem inheres in
the Court’s emphasis on fair notice, rather than substantive sufficiency, which seems to
undergird its decision).
146
See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (claiming that the departure from liberal pleading
standards “is even more pronounced . . . because petitioner has been proceeding . . . without counsel,” but asserting that the allegations were sufficient irrespective
of plaintiff’s pro se status).
147
See id. (noting that “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed’”
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976))).
148
See Editorial, supra note 136, at 54 (asserting that the lower court rulings in
Erickson were out of line with Twombly). One could also argue that, by holding the
complaint sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the Court implicitly acknowledged
that Erickson met the Twombly standard because the Court espoused the belief that
Twombly had not changed pleading requirements.
149
See Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (analyzing the complaint’s assertion that the plaintiff’s removal from treatment “was endangering” his life).
150
See id. (concluding that the allegations alone were sufficient to satisfy pleading
requirements before mentioning liberal construction).
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identified pre-plausibility and does not account for new issues arising
after the modern standard’s conception.
Moreover, the lower courts’ excessive use of the “conclusory” label
to disregard allegations in Erickson’s pro se complaint foreshadowed
151
liberal construction’s inefficacy after Iqbal.
In Iqbal, the Supreme
Court lent its imprimatur to such excesses by deeming certain allegations conclusory without offering a principled way by which to distin152
Lower courts, then,
guish them from other acceptable allegations.
will predictably increase their disregard, unprincipled as it may be, for
conclusory averments to dismiss pro se complaints at a disproportio153
Even if the Sunately higher rate than those drafted by counsel.
preme Court is not comfortable with such usages, its limited discretionary docket prevents it from effectively curtailing them. More
probably, though, the Court expects these excesses to occur, but
shirks responsibility for them by deciding cases like Erickson. Indeed,
that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit so used the “conclusory” label prior to Iqbal, and with regard to an obviously sufficient
complaint, presaged the turn for the worse borne out by the statistical
evidence presented below.
Therefore, even if the Court accepted Erickson as a means to check
perceived excesses resulting from Twombly, its per curiam opinion fails
to breathe enough life into liberal construction to check these excesses with respect to pro se complaints. What remains of liberal construction is that courts should disregard unclear drafting and supplement more accurate legal bases than those explicitly invoked in
determining whether or not pro se complaints suggest plausible en154
titlements to relief. Unfortunately, though, this leniency fails to ensure that meritorious pro se suits proceed to discovery.

151

See Ides, supra note 139, at 638 (asserting that Erickson demonstrates lower
courts’ “overly fastidious and inappropriate insistence on the pleading of ‘nonconclusory’ facts”).
152
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1961 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
majority’s holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be squared with
its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as nonconclusory.”).
153
See infra subsections II.B.2-3 (documenting and explaining the disproportionate increase in the dismissal rate of pro se complaints as compared to other complaints post-Iqbal).
154
See McMahon, supra note 41, at 867-68 (hypothesizing that Erickson simply
means that the plausibility standard should be less stringently applied to pro se complaints than complaints prepared by counsel).
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2. Iqbal’s Exceptional Hostility Toward Pro Se Complaints
Recent evidence belies initial speculation that the new plausibility
155
standard would not significantly increase the overall dismissal rate.
In fact, the most current evaluation of federal pleading practice demonstrates that the rate of dismissal increased by ten percent between
156
Conley and Iqbal, rising from forty-six to fifty-six percent. But, an increase in the rate of dismissal by itself would be less troublesome if
relatively consistent between counseled and pro se litigants. However,
initial evidence strongly suggests that the increase has not evenly affected both classes.
The rate at which pro se complaints are dismissed after Iqbal has
increased by an even greater extent than the overall rate of dismis157
sal. The percentage of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim
“granted in all cases brought by pro se plaintiffs grew from Conley

155

See, e.g., Kendall W. Hannon, Comment, Much Ado About Twombly? A Study on
the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1811, 1815 (2008) (concluding from an initial study of Twombly that the new plausibility standard had “almost no substantive impact,” except in civil rights cases (emphasis in
original)). Importantly, these speculations largely related only to Twombly and did not
predict Iqbal’s strengthening of the plausibility standard. Nevertheless, even after Iqbal, some commentators refuse to acknowledge that the recent Supreme Court rulings
ushered in a new era of pleading and insist that the decisions have not significantly altered how courts evaluate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See, e.g., Has
the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21-23 (2009) (statement of Gregory G. Garre, Partner, Latham &
Watkins LLP), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=4189
(under “Witness Testimony”) (concluding that Twombly and Iqbal have not led to
“wholesale dismissal of claims”). Still, others occupy a more middle ground, declining
to paint the new decisions as contrary to traditional pleading practice and attempting
instead to reconcile the two. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 474 (2010) (“Rather than decrying Twombly as a radical
departure and seeking to overturn it, this Article instead emphasizes Twombly’s connection to prior law and suggests ways in which it can be tamed.”).
156
See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 600 (asserting that Iqbal increased the rate of
dismissal sufficiently to “reject the null hypothesis” that the ruling had no effect on
12(b)(6) motions).
157
Readers should note that the study observed this difference despite excluding
from its sample prisoner complaints reviewed under the PLRA and complaints submitted with an application to proceed in forma pauperis. See id. at 585. Although such an
exclusion, the author notes, is necessary to make the study sound because slight inconsistencies may inhere in pleading standards for these claims and because the risk of
bias is particularly acute, in practice these complaints are overwhelmingly filed by pro
se litigants and are subject to an analysis similar to Iqbal’s. See Rosenbloom, supra note
5, at 322, 324-25 (noting that almost all pro se litigants proceed in forma pauperis and
that a significant number are inmates). Accordingly, the actual discrepancy may be
even more pronounced than that which the study observed.
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158

(67%) . . . to Iqbal (85%).”
Thus, pro se complaints have experienced nearly a twenty percent hike in the rate at which they are dismissed, which is double that experienced by all suits generally. In addition to the increased rate of dismissal, a disparate impact exists
between regimes. Whereas courts dismissed approximately thirty percent more pro se complaints than represented complaints under Conley, after Iqbal, the difference grew to approximately thirty-eight per159
cent. The two-pronged plausibility standard, then, is empirically less
friendly to pro se complaints than it is to those drafted by counsel.
Also troubling is the effect that grants of dismissal have on pro se
complaints. Two statistics are particularly worrisome: “[t]he relative
risk of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s complaint being granted without leave to amend, rather than denied, is over five
160
times greater . . . than for a represented plaintiff,” and “[t]he odds
that a pro se plaintiff’s complaint would be entirely dismissed upon the
grant of a 12(b)(6) motion were 3.48 times greater than a represented
161
Together with the grossly disproportionate dismissal
plaintiff’s.”
rate of pro se suits exacerbated by Iqbal, these numbers illustrate that
plausibility will prevent pro se litigants from accessing discovery more
often than represented litigants. The greater-than-average number of
162
claims asserted and defendants named by pro se litigants highlights
the significance of this concentrated impact.
Thus, Iqbal appears to have emasculated liberal construction as
the tool by which courts protect pro se litigants. Regardless of whether it was effective enough under the “no set of facts” standard, liberal
construction now surely demands reinvigoration if pro se litigants with
163
meritorious claims are to have a fair chance at accessing discovery.
158

Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615.
Id. at 633 tbl.G.
160
Id. at 621 (emphasis added).
161
Id. at 623-24.
162
See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 322-23 tbl.II (presenting data showing the
greater incidence of multiple defendants in pro se cases).
163
See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 615 (detailing the increased rate at which pro se
complaints are dismissed to conclude that “the boilerplate language that pro se plaintiffs’ complaints should be treated with leniency is not taken very seriously” (footnotes
omitted)). For a similar suggestion that the new pleading practice established by Iqbal is
out of step with normative policies underlying civil rights legislation and should therefore be reconsidered, see Howard M. Wasserman, Iqbal, Procedural Mismatches, and Civil
Rights Litigation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 157 (2010). Although there is no abundance
of legislation protecting pro se litigants of the sort that exists with respect to civil rights,
our historical regard for the right to prosecute a case without counsel suggests that
there is what Professor Wasserman terms a “procedural mismatch” between plausibility
159
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Doing so, however, requires understanding the reasons for plausibility’s disproportionate hostility.
3. Explanations for the Disproportionate Increase
in Pro Se Dismissals
The now-retired “no set of facts” standard contained only one
step, which did not by its own terms disproportionately attack pro se
pleadings. Only by manipulation did some courts circumvent its low
threshold to dismiss what were arguably too many pro se complaints.
By contrast, however, the modern plausibility analysis has two steps,
both of which require of courts what, under Conley, was done covertly
and without Supreme Court endorsement: disregarding conclusory
factual allegations and subjecting plaintiffs’ theories of liability to
possible competing inferences. Each of these steps, though, is uniquely poised to disproportionately impact pro se pleadings.
a. Necessarily Conclusory Allegations
Pro se litigants’ circumstances—both economic and noneconomic—render them substantially more likely to articulate claims us164
Conseing what many courts will deem conclusory allegations.
quently, pro se complaints will be stripped of meaningful allegations
without regard for their relationship to surrounding averments. Indeed, the likelihood that this will occur is heightened by judicial disfavor of pro se claims, which largely goes unchecked due to the “con165
clusory” label’s malleability and the relative difficulty in successfully
appealing these determinations.
First, plaintiffs who are forced to proceed pro se by insolvency will
lack the financial wherewithal to conduct the sort of prefiling discovery
166
necessary to draft sufficiently specific allegations.
Purely legal con-

pleading and the policies articulated by liberal construction. It is this mismatch that this
Comment seeks to resolve by reforming the treatment of pro se pleadings.
164
See supra subsection I.B.3 (surveying the general challenges faced by pro se
litigants in crafting acceptable complaints, including those that may lead to less specific allegations).
165
See Kilaru, supra note 122, at 919-20 (asserting that the majority and dissenting
opinions in Iqbal highlight just how “manipulable” the distinction between conclusory
and nonconclusory allegations can be).
166
See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff With Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217,
1257 (2008) (“Whether prudent or not, gathering additional factual information to
include in the complaint is not costless.”); see also Bone, supra note 100, at 860-61
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clusions of the sort considered in Twombly should not be affected, but
factual averments and mixed statements of law and fact upon which
they rely, like those disregarded in Iqbal, will certainly be impacted.
Nowhere will this reality manifest itself more obviously than in pleading mental state, an element without which certain claims, particularly
167
These, however, are
ones concerning civil rights, cannot proceed.
168
precisely the claims that a vast majority of pro se litigants pursue.
Without some form of documentation of defendants’ motive in discrimination suits, for example, pro se plaintiffs will be relegated to pleading
169
purpose quite generally. Such generality very well may prove fatal to
the allegations and, consequently, the complaint as a whole. In fact, it
170
proved fatal with respect to Javaid Iqbal’s complaint, but a poor pro
se litigant presumably would have even less of an opportunity to discover relevant facts before filing than did Iqbal’s lawyer.
Second, even pro se litigants with adequate funds to conduct informal discovery before filing suit will have allegations ignored as conclusory. Without legal training, pro se litigants are much more likely
171
to rely upon pleading templates for guidance. A review of Form 11,
(showing that conclusory allegations are those that are stated at “too high a level of
generality” and therefore need further factual support).
167
See Kilaru, supra note 122, at 927-28 (asserting that information about a defendant’s mental state is difficult to discover, but, without adequately pleading mental
state, motive-based tort claims are likely to fail); see also Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil
Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 485, 498 (1989) (“[I]n numerous civil rights suits,
considerable information important to the factual preparation of complaints that appear specific will be in the records or minds of government or corporate defendants
and cannot be secured before these pleadings must be filed, becoming available only
during discovery.”).
168
See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 613 (discussing data showing that about half of
the civil rights cases studied in the article were initiated pro se); Rosenbloom, supra
note 5, at 320 (noting that in a study of pro se litigants, the most common complaints
were civil rights actions).
169
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure endorse general allegations regarding
elements of this nature. See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b) (permitting “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally”). However,
the majority in Iqbal asserted that this rule “merely excuses a party from . . . an elevated
pleading standard” of the sort imposed upon claims of fraud by Rule 9(b). Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1954 (2009). Therefore, even allegations of discriminatory intent, and other states of mind, are subject to the limitation on conclusory statements.
170
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1954 (concluding that Iqbal’s “complaint fail[ed] to
plead sufficient facts”).
171
That proponents of strengthening pro se assistance advocate for increased
access to such materials demonstrates pro se litigants’ substantial reliance on them.
See, e.g., VanWormer, supra note 20, at 1014-15 (considering as necessary to assist pro
se litigants a “centralized clearinghouse” through which pro se litigants can access
“printable forms necessary to initiate a case and make motions, as well as instructional
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172

appended to the Federal Rules, though, demonstrates that following
these exemplars may prove detrimental to pro se litigants. The
Form 11 model encourages plaintiffs to plead negligent operation of a
motor vehicle without asserting what aspect of the defendant’s driving
173
was negligent, such as, for example, swerving or speeding. However,
“it is difficult to see the difference between this negligence allegation
174
and the key allegations [disregarded] in Iqbal.” The likelihood that
these allegations are ignored is not only attributable to their obvious
level of generality, but also to their resemblance to legal conclusions,
175
Thus, the
which courts have long excluded from consideration.
Federal Rules entice pro se litigants to plead using shorthand factual
176
allegations, while courts, with Supreme Court approval, are apt to
177
punish them for doing so. In this way, pro se litigants are unusually
disadvantaged by the first prong of the plausibility analysis.
By excluding critical allegations from consideration, courts are
178
able to more easily deem a complaint’s theory implausible.
Thus,
judicial power to disregard “direct allegations of liability-creating conduct” can be wielded to dismiss disfavored claims by disfavored parmaterials related to the filing of such forms”). The importance of the forms appended
to the Federal Rules cannot be overstated, as their primary architect, Charles Clark,
considered them “the most important part of the rules” concerning pleading. See
Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 181 (1958) (“We require a general statement. How much? Well, the answer is made in what I think is
probably the most important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is concerned, namely, the Forms.”).
172
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (setting forth the minimal allegations necessary to
plead basic negligence, including date, place, and that the defendant “negligently
drove a motor vehicle” resulting in injury to plaintiff).
173
See Bone, supra note 100, at 861 (acknowledging that Form 11 makes no mention of what defendant’s car did to hit plaintiff or why it is alleged to have constituted
negligence).
174
Id. For one court’s acknowledgement that Iqbal calls into question the continuing viability of the Federal Rule Forms, see Doe ex rel. Gonzalez v. Butte Valley Unified
School District, No. 09-0245, 2009 WL 2424608, at *6-7 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2009).
175
See Ides, supra note 139, at 612 (asserting that the allegation of negligence in
Form 9 is both a conclusion of law and an “assertion of fact . . . that . . . defendant
drove in a manner below the standard of due care”); see also Bone, supra note 100, at
866 (“Today, it is settled law that a judge deciding a 12(b)(6) motion need not accept
legal conclusions . . . as true.” (citation omitted)).
176
See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (“The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules
and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.”).
177
The inconsistency perhaps stems from the Supreme Court’s circumvention of the
appropriate rulemaking process by which to affect formal changes to pleading doctrine.
178
See Bone, supra note 100, at 861-62 (claiming that the Iqbal majority made it easier to conclude that the complaint failed the second prong by aggressively using the
first prong).
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179

ties.
The legal community’s negative perception of pro se litigants
makes them likely targets of such unequal use of this discretionary au180
Bias against pro se litigants, though, even more deeply inthority.
fects Iqbal’s second prong.
b. Biased Plausibility
While earlier developments in summary judgment practice pro181
vide general insight into how pleading standards have changed,
one particular parallel has unfortunately emerged for pro se litigants.
182
It is the potential for judicial “cognitive illiberalism” : “an inability
to recognize how cultural background influences one’s own (as op183
Indeed, the likelihood that
posed to others’) decisionmaking.”
such cognitive biases infect determinations is greatest at the pleading
stage, during which neither party introduces evidence for considera184
tion by the judge.
Professors Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman studied Scott v. Harris, in
which the Supreme Court relied on a video of a high-speed chase to reconsider a trial court’s factual findings and ultimately reverse its denial
185
of summary judgment.
The Court held that no reasonable juror
could find that the respondent, the fleeing driver, did not pose a deadly risk to the public, thus warranting the force used by police to end
186
the chase. A study of the public’s own reactions to the video, howev179
Burbank, supra note 16, at 117 (asserting that by giving judges the power to disregard factual allegations, Iqbal strengthened plausibility as “an invitation to the lower
federal courts to screen out complaints in disfavored classes of cases”).
180
See supra subsection I.B.3 (discussing bias against pro se litigants).
181
For a detailed discussion of the lessons about pleading that can be learned
from summary judgment, see generally Hoffman, supra note 166, at 1240-43. For a
more extreme take on the links between the two procedural devices, see Thomas, supra
note 92, at 28-34.
182
See Dan M. Kahan, David A. Hoffman & Donald Braman, Whose Eyes Are You
Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV.
837, 842-43 (2009) (coining the term and explaining its effect on the Court’s decision
to grant summary judgment).
183
Christopher Slobogin, The Perils of the Fight Against Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV.
L. REV. F. 1, 2 (2009), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/slobogin.pdf.
184
See Has the Supreme Court Limited Americans’ Access to Courts?, supra note 121, at
12-13 (explaining that the prejudicial effect of “cognitive illiberalism” is more “worrisome” at the motion to dismiss stage because of the lack of an evidentiary record).
185
See 550 U.S. 372, 386 (2007) (finding a police officer entitled to summary
judgment).
186
See id. (“The car chase that respondent initiated in this case posed a substantial
and immediate risk of serious physical injury to others; no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise.”).
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er, indicated the contrary. Members of certain subcommunities sharing
common experiences and values—eerily reminiscent of the experience
and common sense referred to in Iqbal—perceived less danger in the
187
plaintiff’s flight and attributed more responsibility to police.
According to the authors, this division demonstrated that the
Court operated in a state of cognitive illiberalism; it displayed “overconfidence in the unassailable correctness of [its] factual percep188
tions . . . and unwarranted contempt for [contrary] perceptions.”
189
The potential for the same “type of decisionmaking hubris” to afflict
courts’ determinations on the plausibility of plaintiffs’ claims is significant. The analysis requires courts to imagine other possible explana190
tions for allegations put forth in complaints, which courts may favor
if they more closely align with the judges’ predispositions or experiences. Indeed, the Supreme Court endorsed a process similar to this
bias by emphasizing “judicial experience and common sense” as the
191
lens through which to evaluate plausibility.
The subjectivity that inheres in the comparative endeavor portends special trouble for pro se litigants and the liberal construction
192
afforded their complaints. As a group, pro se litigants have “identi193
ty-defining characteristics” that differ from lower court judges. Unlike members of the federal bench and their clerks, for example, a
194
majority of pro se litigants are black, Asian, or Hispanic. Kahan and
187

See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 841 (noting that segments of
the public that value egalitarianism and social solidarity more than hierarchy and individualism tended to disagree with the Court’s conclusion in Scott v. Harris).
188
Id. at 843.
189
Id. at 842.
190
See, e.g., Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 711 (7th Cir.
2008) (“The plausibility of an explanation depends on the plausibility of the alternative explanations.”).
191
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009) (noting that a court must
draw on its “judicial experience and common sense” when determining the plausibility
of a claim); Burbank, supra note 16, at 118 (“The Iqbal Court’s reliance on ‘judicial experience and common sense’ is, in certain types of cases, an invitation to ‘cognitive
illiberalism’ . . . .”).
192
See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 30-31 (noting that the rule set forth
in Haines runs into trouble because “plausibility is inherently subjective and judges likely
gauge ‘plausibility’ differently based on their ideologies, attitudes, and experiences”).
193
See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 879 (asserting that individuals whose opinions differed from the Court’s shared “a core of identity-defining
characteristics”).
194
See OFFICE OF DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELFREPRESENTED LITIGANTS: CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES 3 (2005), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/reports/AJJI_SelfRep06.pdf (reporting that over eighty percent of pro se litigants surveyed were not Caucasian).
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his coauthors observed that racial differences can result in not only
opposing perceptions of a set of facts, but, more importantly, conflict195
ing conclusions based thereon. The difference manifests in the parties these populations tend to support, with minorities favoring plain196
tiffs more often than Causasians.
Furthermore, poorer pro se litilitigants tend to harbor a greater level of suspicion toward authority
197
198
That most pro se litigants sue governmental officials
figures.
renders this difference critical to plausibility decisions because
courts—significant wielders of authority themselves—may unintentionally favor alternative, lawful explanations for alleged official mis199
In fact, pro se litigants’ distrust of the court system over
conduct.
200
which judges exercise control exacerbates the disconnect. These, as
well as other, influential differences between pro se litigants and the
201
courts evaluating their complaints raise the specter of unintentional
202
privileging of competing inferences.
Accordingly, without a version of liberal construction that adequately accounts for the change in pleading standards that Iqbal finalized, courts risk alienating a group of citizens by summarily dismissing their claims as undeserving of discovery. The result is particularly
ironic because pro se litigants are the only group of litigants selected
for special accommodations at the pleading stage of litigation.

195

Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 867.
See id. (finding that African Americans were significantly more likely to find for
plaintiffs than Caucasians).
197
See id. at 879-80 (noting that differences, including degrees of wealth, affected
whether individuals “view[ed] those in authority with trust or suspicion”).
198
See Rosenbloom, supra note 5, at 323 (“Almost four out of every five pro se cases
were filed against at least one government defendant.”).
199
See, e.g., Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093,
1154 (2008) (“[T]he courts tend to reflect the insider view that discrimination is rare
and that most claims are meritless, rather than the opposing view that discrimination is
pervasive.”) For an assertion that the majority in Iqbal displayed these institutional biasing effects, see Spencer, supra note 119, at 197-99.
200
See supra subsection I.B.2 (listing the reasons that litigants choose to proceed
pro se, which include distrust for lawyers and the legal system in general).
201
For an acknowledgement that judges as a group may differ in their explanations of facts from other groups as a result of “legal and judicial professionalization,”
see Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 883.
202
This discussion should be read neither to insinuate bad faith on the part of
federal judges construing pro se complaints nor to deny the myriad differences between federal pro se litigants. Instead, it is intended merely to call attention to the potential for the plausibility inquiry to disadvantage certain pro se complaints that an
identifiable group of self-represented litigants tend to pursue and that implicate the
courts’ inherent trust in official behavior.
196
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III. REFASHIONING LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
IN A POST-PLAUSIBILITY ERA
Liberal construction’s commendable components—the most notable of which is the judicial practice of inferring the correct cause of
203
action from complaints invoking an incorrect one —should be retained because plausibility has not rendered them unfit to accommodate pro se litigants. However, as a rule meant to support meritorious
pro se litigation, liberal construction should be strengthened to ac204
count for the difficulties the new plausibility standard presents. First,
courts should demand less specificity of factual allegations drafted by
pro se litigants in order to comport with the policy underlying liberal
construction. Second, favored competing inferences must be transparent in order to prevent pro se litigants from repeating the errors that
205
initially caused dismissal when amending their complaints.
A. Restraining Judicial Authority to Carve Complaints
Although Erickson presaged Iqbal’s negative impact on pro se
206
complaints, the Supreme Court’s decision also suggested a way to
mitigate the troublesome effect: restrain courts’ discretion to disre207
gard allegations they deem conclusory. Building upon this foundation, liberal construction should require courts to consider all pro se
203

See, e.g., Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that the
lower court should have treated a pro se plaintiff’s claim as one made pursuant to
§ 1983, despite having been styled as one for habeas corpus).
204
Notably, these challenges emerged prior to Twombly as a result of lower courts’
informal elevation of pleading requirements. Thus, even if Congress overturns Twombly and Iqbal by statute, see, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504,
111th Cong. (2009), these adaptations would still help to ensure that pro se litigants
receive the accommodations necessary to protect their access to courts.
205
These recommendations are an attempt to adapt to the new plausibility standard, rather than to repudiate it as an incorrect construction of federal pleading requirements. They would most appropriately be implemented by judicial decree, just as
was liberal construction itself. Indeed, a modified rule of liberal construction is illsuited to both the rulemaking and legislative processes. The Federal Rules are transsubstantive, rendering a party-specific rule anathema. And, while the federal government has codified special pleading requirements in the past, in this context, an analogous statute would unnecessarily constrain the judicial flexibility needed to
accommodate pro se litigants.
206
See supra subsection II.B.1 (explaining why Erickson provides little assurance
that liberal construction as presently practiced will meet the challenges facing pro se
litigants post-Iqbal).
207
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (admonishing the
lower court for dismissing allegations as conclusory when they were adequate to “put
the[] matters in issue”).
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allegations in evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion unless they are pure
legal conclusions. That way, courts will not unintentionally punish
pro se litigants for crafting allegations as specifically as their circumstances and legal acumen permit.
Strengthening liberal construction with such a supplement is not
without support in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For example, Rule 1 instructs courts to construe and administer the Rules to
208
ensure “just” determinations.
Similarly, Rule 8(e) demands that
209
“[p]leadings . . . be construed so as to do justice.” With a principled
distinction between conclusory and acceptable factual allegations
210
evading even the strongest legal minds, pro se litigants most certainly cannot be expected to grasp the difference. A lack of experience
with courts exascerbates this inability, as increased interaction with
the courts would provide them, as it does practicing lawyers, an intui211
tive sense of how judges decide Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Accordingly,
to administer pleading requirements to ensure fair results, pro se litigants should be better insulated from the admonition against conclu212
sory factual allegations that they are unable to identify ex ante.
To implement this rule, however, a principled distinction must
still be established between purely legal conclusions and general or
shorthand factual allegations, and it must be one that pro se litigants
213
can fairly be expected to comprehend.
For purposes of liberally
208

See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (requiring that the Rules “be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
209
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(e).
210
See Walter Wheeler Cook, Statements of Fact in Pleading Under the Codes, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 416, 417 (1921) (rejecting the assumption “that there is some clear, easily
drawn and scientific distinction” between facts and conclusions aside from the level of
specificity at which they are stated). Indeed, the endeavor proved so difficult that the
drafters of the Federal Rules abandoned it altogether. See Burbank, supra note 16, at
115 (“Yet, an important reason why the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules rejected fact
pleading is that one person’s ‘factual allegation’ is another’s ‘conclusion.’” (citing Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 574-75 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
211
See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their Clients Justice?
An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litigation Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1235, 1252-53 (2006) (“[A]s experts and repeat players in the court system, litigating attorneys should have . . . better access to information about what the . . . judge
likely will do.”).
212
For the origins of this functional argument, see Email from Stephen B. Burbank, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School, to author (Nov. 11, 2009,
14:52 EST) (on file with author).
213
Although any attempt to distinguish between legal conclusions and factual allegations superficially harkens back to code pleading, which has long been rejected,
the gloss that follows does not resuscitate the hypertechnical distinctions of yore. Rather, it seeks to establish a uniquely low specificity threshold beyond which allegations
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construing pro se complaints, then, legal conclusions that courts need
not presume true should be only those in which pro se plaintiffs assert
that defendants’ conduct either (1) amounts to a violation of the law
or (2) satisfies an element of the alleged offense in obviously “canoni214
All other allegations, including the mixed statements of
cal form.”
law and fact that comprise the majority of complaints, should be presumed true. For example, a pro se prisoner’s averment that a particular punishment constituted retaliation for free speech, and therefore
violated the First Amendment, would not pass muster. By contrast, if
that same plaintiff alleged that a prison guard subjected her to harsh
conditions of confinement because of complaints she made about the
guard’s behavior, the statement would be presumptively entitled to
consideration in determining the complaint’s plausibility. Simply put,
courts should accept general statements regarding objectively verifiable facts, but reject legal determinations supposed to be made from
those statements: the motive for certain conduct can be confirmed or
disproved by evidence, while that conduct’s constitutionality is a de215
termination made only in light of such evidence.
Severely curtailing courts’ ability to carve conclusory factual allegations from pro se complaints errs on the side of considering allegations and thereby heightens the chance that claims are deemed plaus-

are entitled to the presumption of truth for one particular subgroup of litigants
whom courts have singled out for special treatment due to policy considerations. In
that regard, it benefits from the work of a leading scholar during the code-pleading
era and one of its strongest critics, Walter Wheeler Cook, who believed that factual
specificity differentiates conclusions from allegations and that the required amount of
specificity should comport with “notions of fairness and convenience.” Cook, supra
note 210, at 422-23.
214
See Bone, supra note 100, at 867 n.94 (suggesting that one extreme way to narrow the class of excludable conclusions is to limit it to “allegations that simply insert
‘plaintiff’ and ‘defendant’ into a legal proposition otherwise stated in some recognizably canonical form”).
215
See id. at 873-74 (discussing objectively verifiable facts in the context of plausibility analysis). Drawing the line at objective verifiability comports with the previous
acknowledgment that Form 11 should be sufficient to entitle pro se plaintiffs to discovery. It requires a plaintiff claiming basic negligence to state only, “On [X] date, at
[X] place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.” FED.
R. CIV. P. Form 11. Its use of the term “negligently,” however, is not a legal conclusion
that can be disregarded, but rather just a description of the defendant’s driving, like
“sporadic” or “substandard,” which can be objectively verified through discovery. See
supra subsection II.B.3.a (discussing Form 11 as endorsing shorthand factual allegations). Accordingly, similar descriptive terms that resemble legal conclusions should
not be disregarded when liberally construing pro se complaints. Cf. Bone, supra note
100, at 873-74 (explaining that some conclusory statements do provide the court with a
sufficient basis to evaluate a claim’s success under the plausibility standard).
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216

ible.
However, this recommendation should not be interpreted to
strip courts of their ability to dismiss overly fanciful or clearly outrageous claims and claims for which there is absolutely no valid basis in
the law because the plausibility prong remains intact. Therefore, such
217
claims—the majority of which are admittedly pursued pro se —will
not survive motions to dismiss despite the change outlined above. Although similarly emasculating Iqbal’s first prong may be prudent for
entire classes of claims involving hard-to-verify facts, the transsubstantive application of the Federal Rules would not permit such a development. However, because pro se litigants have already been selected
for special treatment, transsubstantivity should not block their entitlement to a less stringent version of Iqbal’s first prong.
B. Making Inferences Transparent to Assist with Complaint Amendments
Courts are presently amenable to granting pro se litigants leave to
218
Although exceedingly liberal access to
amend their complaints.
amendments should be retained for pro se plaintiffs, such access is of
little use when unaccompanied by transparent explanations as to why
219
particular complaints are insufficient. Failures to set forth such explanations are likely to increase post-Iqbal because of the subjectivity
that inheres in plausibility analysis and courts’ inability to recognize
220
that perceptions of factual circumstances differ among groups. Accordingly, the inferences that courts believe render theories of
wrongdoing implausible should be made clear so pro se litigants can

216

See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1959-60 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority that, without the factual allegations disregarded as
conclusory, the complaint failed to state a plausible claim to relief); Bone, supra note
100, at 861-62 (noting that Iqbal’s first prong “did all the work” by making it easy to
conclude that the complaint did not raise a plausible inference of wrongdoing).
217
See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to “Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1142
(1994) (“[P]ro se litigants file a large proportion of the nut claims.”).
218
See, e.g., Shomo v. City of New York, 579 F.3d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[A] pro
se complaint . . . should not [be] dismiss[ed] without granting leave to amend at least
once . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)).
219
See Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and
Those of the Appearance of Neutrality When Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 423, 436-40 (2004) (discussing
transparency as essential to providing pro se litigants meaningful judicial accommodations and noting that explanation is a “particularly important” component of that
transparency).
220
For a fuller discussion of this type of unintentional decisionmaking confidence
or “hubris,” see supra subsection II.B.3.b.
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better supplement their complaints to undercut the viability of those
221
inferences and thereby increase the plausibility of their own.
222
A heightened sense of “judicial humility” in drawing competing
inferences is perhaps the first step toward increasing the aforementioned transparency. Courts should second-guess their disregard for
inferences upon which pro se plaintiffs rely to ensure that their disbelief is not motivated by a difference in values or predispositions, but
rather by a more neutral conviction that the inferences would not persuade individuals sharing even the litigants’ “identity-defining”
223
traits. That way, courts will be both less likely to alienate pro se litigants by discounting inferences that these litigants, as a recognizable
group, deem credible, and better able to identify favored competing
inferences when granting leave to amend. As a result, pro se litigants
will understand the allegations requiring additional factual enhancement to make the necessary, but unmade, inferences plausible and
limit courts’ skepticism. Indeed, including suggestions in the opinion
as to the types of support needed to sustain missing elements would
be advisable, as pro se litigants may otherwise neglect to include all
the facts within their possession on the assumption that complaints
224
should be as “short and plain” as possible.
In fact, despite having unabashedly privileged its own perception
of the facts alleged in Iqbal, one redeeming quality of the majority’s
opinion in that case is its presentation of the competing inference
that, for five Justices, made Iqbal’s claim implausible. In particular,
the majority expressly stated its belief that, in light of the recent Sep221

A related approach would permit plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery to
quell courts’ skepticism as to plausibility. See, e.g., Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading
and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on
Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 140 (2010) (“Where the complaint’s
implausibility is due to an informational inequity, an opportunity to re-plead does little
good without some narrow discovery to ameliorate the problem.”). Additional transparency would work well in conjunction with predismissal discovery because it would
direct the discovery and thereby limit its cost.
222
See Kahan, Hoffman & Braman, supra note 182, at 897-99 (defining “judicial
humility” as a way by which judges can prevent privileging value-laden perceptions
over competing perceptions likely made by groups with different “identity-defining
characteristics”).
223
See id. at 898-99 (urging a process whereby judges reconsider their conclusions
that no reasonable juror could find wrongdoing to make sure that they do not denigrate the views of particular communities that perceive facts differently).
224
For a compelling discussion of why “cause of action” information should not
generate concerns over judicial partiality, see Jona Goldschmidt, Judicial Assistance to
Self-Represented Litigants: Lessons from the Canadian Experience, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L.
601, 622-23 (2009).
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tember 11th attacks, the high-ranking officials likely placed Iqbal in
restrictive confinement because of his suspected terrorist connections
225
and not on account of his nationality or race. At least, then, if Iqbal
had not retained counsel, his opportunity to amend the complaint
would remain meaningful. Iqbal could have, for instance, alleged deficient intelligence connecting him to terrorism in order to rebut the
Court’s conviction that defendants acted lawfully and render the proposed inference of wrongdoing plausible. To go one step further,
discussing the type of factual support tending to adequately “show”
motive in the relevant context would at least place him on a more level playing field with litigants whose lawyers understand the type of
226
support required to succeed.
Although post-analysis treatment of pro se complaints cannot
properly be labeled a method of liberal construction, it is nevertheless
a critical extension of the leeway given pro se litigants at the pleading
stage of litigation. The present liberal amendment practice with respect to pro se litigants cannot compensate adequately for the pleading
developments Iqbal enshrined unless significant transparency is infused
into the highly subjective second prong of the analysis. Discerning
competing inferences that must be rebutted is a daunting task for lawyers well-versed in drafting complaints, let alone pro se litigants. Thus,
like limiting the grant of authority to disregard conclusory allegations,
requiring greater explanation as to the deficiencies courts perceive in
227
pro se complaints will promote the goal of liberal construction.
C. Addressing Concerns Related to Neutrality, Caseload, and Abuse
Pro se advocacy necessarily arouses concerns over judicial neutrality, docket burden, and litigation abuse. Accordingly, it is important
to address these concerns because the techniques set forth above
will, as intended, lead to pro se litigants accessing discovery in greater numbers. These issues, though, fail to counsel convincingly
against a more robust version of liberal construction, particularly in
225

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951-52 (2009) (noting that all the alleged
nonconclusory facts can be read to suggest is that defendants placed plaintiff in restrictive confinement because he was a suspected terrorist, which does not plausibly suggest
invidious discrimination).
226
For a similar suggestion that instructions to pro se litigants be included in orders granting leave to amend so that they can correct defects in their complaints, see
Zeigler & Hermann, supra note 64, at 211.
227
See supra Section III.A (articulating a functional argument for constraining
judicial capacity to disregard “conclusory” allegations based upon Rules 1 and 8(e)).
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light of the alternative mechanisms available by which to check excessive pro se litigation.
Some commentators—most notably Judge Bacharach and Professor Entzeroth—argue against robust liberal construction because, in
228
their opinion, it destroys judicial neutrality. However, their criticism
does not target adaptations like the first supplement to liberal construction proposed above. Constraining courts’ authority to disregard
factual allegations does not require judges to treat pro se complaints
in a manner that conflicts with their authors’ intentions. In fact, it accomplishes quite the opposite. Requiring courts to accept more allegations as presented by pro se litigants will better align their treatment
of pro se complaints with litigants’ expectations, precisely the goal of
229
Moreover, while concerns
Bacharach and Entzeroth’s critique.
about judicial partiality are perhaps more relevant to the second supplement proposed herein, they are still insufficient to counsel against
its implementation. Increasing transparency with respect to pro se
complaints aids self-represented litigants by making meaningful
amendments more accessible. However, it requires judges neither to
substantially alter the process by which they evaluate the sufficiency of
pro se complaints nor to advocate on behalf of pro se litigants by affirmatively correcting substantive inadequacies.
While these proposals separately fail to blur the line between neutrality and advocacy, together they do warrant skepticism regarding
the increased workload that will result from their implementation.
Nonetheless, several observations allay these concerns. First, early statistics indicate that Twombly and Iqbal may actually decrease the num230
Thus, to the exber of pro se suits that are filed in the first place.
tent that this trend continues, it may negate at least some of the extra
workload shouldered by courts overseeing more pro se discovery. Indeed, one of the benefits of working within the plausibility regime (rather than exempting pro se litigants from it completely) is the standard’s ability to discourage less meritorious filings. In addition,
limiting the effort required of judges liberally construing pro se complaints could counterbalance the resulting increase in discovery228

See Bacharach & Entzeroth, supra note 7, at 42 (“The effort to equalize adversarial ability is a futile endeavor, but the hopelessness of the task is not the greatest
danger. Instead, the greater danger is the loosening of the well-designed constraints
on the role of the judiciary in the adversarial process.”).
229
See id. at 43 (“The key to construction of pro se pleadings involves an understanding of what the litigant has said.”).
230
See Hatamyar, supra note 15, at 613 (“Interestingly, the percentage of pro se
plaintiffs . . . declined from Conley (30%) to Twombly (27%) to Iqbal (24%).”).
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related burdens. The reductions in time and energy spent parsing
conclusory from nonconclusory allegations and reconsidering
amended complaints should permit courts to dedicate more attention
to pro se cases after deciding motions to dismiss.
A related issue to which many attribute the recent shift in pleading standards involves discovery costs incurred by defendants and the
potential for abusive litigation. This concern is particularly acute in
the context of pro se litigation, which admittedly involves more unmeritorious claims. However, the costs likely to result from more pro se
discovery will not be grave because pro se claims are on the whole
231
Their simplicity
much simpler than actions pursued with counsel.
renders pro se claims particularly amenable to supervised discovery,
which should quickly reveal to defendants whether or not a summary
judgment motion would succeed. In addition, the leeway afforded pro
se litigants does not exempt them from Rule 11 sanctions for failing to
affirm (1) that “reasonable prefiling inquiry has shown that a filing’s
claims and assertions are ‘well grounded in fact and [are] warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for [a change] of existing law’”
and (2) that “the filing ‘is not interposed for any improper purpose,
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in
232
These sanctions should continue to deter
the cost of litigation.’”
some of the excesses that have come to characterize pro se cases.
Leaving the gate to discovery slightly more ajar for pro se litigants
will not grind the gears of our federal judicial system to a halt. Accordingly, a stronger version of liberal construction is warranted in light
of the countervailing fairness concerns that underlie the system’s historic support for self-representation.
CONCLUSION
Liberal construction developed in response to challenges facing
pro se litigants that courts identified as having the potential to unfairly
deny them access to discovery. As the term itself suggests, those challenges consisted of the potential for (1) incomprehensible or “inart231

See supra note 57 (examining the complexity of pro se suits and the burden
they impose on courts).
232
Nichols, supra note 49, at 355 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11). The 1983 revisions
to Rule 11 eliminated unrepresented litigants’ previous exemption from the Rule’s
reach. Id. at 355-56. Now, “the rule unequivocably reaches the conduct of pro se litigants . . . [and] no federal court may claim that it is powerless to administer [R]ule 11
sanctions against unrepresented parties whose filings it finds to be frivolous-in-fact, frivolous-in-law, or improperly motivated.” Id. at 357; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
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ful” drafting and (2) incorrect or incomplete invocation of the legal
bases for claims. That these difficulties do not include the potential
for the standard for evaluating complaints to punish pro se litigants
reflects the background notice-pleading regime under which the
Supreme Court first granted the leniency. The Conley “no set of
facts” standard raised a deceptively low bar to pleading a cause of action adequately, thereby posing little threat of inherent unfairness to
pro se litigants.
Only through informal channels did lower courts heighten pleading requirements to make suits pursued by particular claimants, including pro se litigants, more vulnerable to dismissal for failure to
state a claim. The unexpressed nature of this development perhaps
excuses, or at least explains, the system’s previous failure to reevaluate
liberal construction as an adequate accommodation to pro se litigants.
However, Iqbal removed the disguise, ushering in a new era of heightened pleading requirements. Plausibility analysis adds yet another
unique challenge to the set of concerns initially identified as requiring
liberal construction of pro se pleadings since each of its prongs unfairly punishes unrepresented litigants. As a result, courts would be remiss not to allow greater leniency for self-represented litigants at the
pleading stage of litigation.
This Comment endeavors to provide insight into exactly how the
plausibility standard disproportionately undercuts the efforts of pro se
litigants to access discovery in order to highlight why two particular
supplements to liberal construction are advisable. Without meaningful adaptations of the sort here proposed, our legal system risks not
only defying the longstanding statutory protections afforded to the
right of self-representation, but also infringing upon pro se litigants’
constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

